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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Internet's emergence as a retail marketplace has both
posed new issues and cast old problems in a new light. As
technology, particularly software, has advanced over time,
traditional bricks and mortar firms have acquired the capability
of tracking and analyzing all sorts of information about their
customers, including purchasing patterns and demographic
information.' For years, firms have been licensing and selling
such customer data both in and out of bankruptcy without much
fear of legal limitations.2 In particular, the law has generally not
adopted privacy rules that would present a barrier to commerce
in personal information.3
1. See generally Stephanie Stoughton, Toysmart Offer Hit by Advocates, Say
Disney Bid to Buy, Retire CustomerList Doesn't Ensure Privacy, BOSTON GLOBE, July 14,
2000, at C1 [hereinafter Toysmart Offer Hit by Advocates], availableat 2000 WL 3334550.
2. "Catalog companies, retail chains and marketers routinely swap and purchase
customer lists." Id.
3. See, e.g., Dwyer v. American Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1353, 1355 (l. App.
Ct. 1995) (holding that American Express and its related companies did not violate their
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Internet retailers (e-tailers) can compile and process the
same types of information as their bricks and mortar
counterparts. Indeed, they can and do gather even more
information, in part because the electronic medium fosters
immediacy and allows consumers to interact with sellers in a
seemingly more personal way than in the "real" world.!
Consumers may provide some information willingly by, for
example, answering online questionnaires about purchasing
preferences or providing the data necessary to permit the e-tailer
to ship a product.5 Consumers may also provide certain
information unwittingly. Software can track what Web sites and
pages a consumer visits, and what the consumer doesn't purchase
as well as what she does.6 In many cases, the most valuable asset
that an e-commerce company "owns" is its customer database.7
The cost of obtaining this asset, however, may be
considerable. Surveys show that many consumers refuse to shop
on the Internet because they fear loss of control over their
personal information.' To secure their customers' trust, e-tailers
card holders' rights of privacy when they leased lists of card holder names grouped by
purchasing patterns to others). The court did, however, hold that the defendants violated
Illinois consumer protection law by failing to disclose their intent to share card holders'
purchasing patterns with others, but found that no damages were shown. See id. at 135657.
4. "The ability of the internet to aid business in the collection, storage, transfer,
and analysis of information about a consumer's habits is unprecedented. While this
technology can allow business to better target goods and services, it also has increased
consumer fears about the collection and use of personally identifiable information."
Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, 146 CONG. REC. S7656, S7668
(daily ed. July 26, 2000) (statement of Sen. McCain) [hereinafter Statements on
Introduced Bills]; see also Michael J. Martinez, PricingErrorsHurtingAmazon.com, AP
ONLINE, Sept. 28, 2000, available at 2000 WL 27212549 (discussing how software tools
allow e-tailers to compile detailed customer profiles).
5.
See Toysmart Offer Hit by Advocates, supranote 1 ("Even the most rudimentary
e-commerce sites gather and store information such as customers' names, e-mail
addresses, home addresses and purchases.").
6.
Refer to note 20 infra (explaining the Internet's ability to accumulate customer
information).
7.
See, e.g., Nick Wingfield, Amazon Explains How It May Share Customer Data,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2000, at B2, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 3042189 (noting that
customer lists are among dot-coins few and most valuable assets when those firms fail).
See also Toysmart Offer Hit by Advocates, supra note 1 ("Internet customer data can
command a high price if it contains a large number of repeat buyers and extensive
information about their preferences .... ).
8.
The studies are numerous and the results vary, but they do reveal that
consumers generally view online privacy as an important issue. See, e.g., Neil Munro,
Privacy's Price, NAT'L J., Sept. 2, 2000, available at 2000 WL 25041452 (stating that the
number of consumers who are "very concerned" about their privacy and "unwilling to
compromise on it" has grown from 20 percent in the early 1990s to 30 percent, but also
noting that some 20 percent "don't care" at all, and roughly 50 percent would be willing to
trade their privacy in return for some benefits, if they believe they can trust the data
collector); Michael Sonsino, Study Addresses Consumer Concerns about Online Privacy,
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have had to take steps that their bricks and mortar counterparts
have not. Many have posted privacy policies on their Web sites,
sometimes promising not to share the consumer's personal data
with any third party.9 As dot-coin bankruptcies mount, however,
the bankruptcy trustee1" may seek to sell this valuable data to
maximize the size of the estate available to pay unsecured
claims." Should the trustee be bound by the site's promise not to
sell the information?
This question exploded into the collective consciousness
when Toysmart.com, an e-tailer of educational toys, sought to sell
its customer list in bankruptcy despite its promise never to share
such data. 2 Although the agreement by one of Toysmart's
investors to purchase and destroy the list resolved the case, the
questions it raised linger. 3
Safety, U-WIRE, Sept. 19, 2000, available at 2000 WL 26933934 (contending that 61
percent of those who do not shop online cite concerns about privacy and security as
reasons for not doing so). Forrester Research estimates that consumer spending online
would have been $12.4 billion higher in 1999 if consumers were not worried about the
privacy of their information. Anthony Shadid, Crackdown Seen on Customer Databases,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 8, 2001, at C1, available at 2001 WL 3914023.
9.
See, e.g., William Glanz, FTC Fights Firm'sSale of On-Line Data, WASH. TmIES,
July 11, 2000, at Al, available at 2000 WL 4159837 (declaring that Toysmart's privacy
policy forbade disclosing customer's information to third parties). A Georgetown
University survey states that in 1999, only 9.5 percent of commercial Web sites had
comprehensive privacy policies. Id. However, IBMs Chief Privacy Officer has stated that
"90 percent of the top 100 most visited Web sites" have some version of a privacy policy.
Lawmakers Agree Self-Regulation Has Merit, But Privacy Legislation Will Still Be
Needed, 6 ELEc. COM. & L. REP. (BNA) No. I at 8 (Jan. 3, 2001). Generally, sites can use
their privacy policies to differentiate themselves from others in the marketplace. Larren
M. Nashelsky, On-Line Privacy Collides with Bankruptcy Creditors,224 N.Y.L.J. 40, Aug.
28, 2000, at sl.
A trustee administers property in Chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidation cases. 11
10.
U.S.C. § 704 (1994). Chapter 11 reorganization cases do not regularly involve a trustee.
See id. § 1104. Instead, the debtor most often stays in control of the business in a Chapter
11 reorganization. See id. §§ 1107-1108. In such cases, the law calls the debtor the
"debtor-in-possession." See id. § 1101. This Article (like the Bankruptcy Code) uses the
term "trustee" to refer to either the trustee or the debtor-in-possession. Id. §§ 1101, 1107.
11.
The Bankruptcy Code uses the term "estate" in two separate ways. When used
to describe the trustee's assembling of assets in which the debtor has an interest, "estate"
refers to the asset itself. See id. §§ 542-543, 704(1). For example, if the debtor holds title
to Blackacre but First Bank has a mortgage on it, for purposes of administering the asset,
Blackacre, the word estate refers to the realty itself which the trustee will sell or with
which it will otherwise deal. A second usage, however, refers to the debtor's intangible
interest in something. The Code uses the word "estate" in this sense when it refers to the
value of the debtor's assets. See id. § 541(a)(1). Using our preceding example, the estate of
the debtor would include the title to Blackacre but not the mortgage. The debtor's
intangible interest is available exclusively to satisfy unsecured claims. See id. §§ 726(a),
1129(a)(7)(A). Thus, the textual statement refers to this second meaning of the word
"estate."
Refer to Part II.A.3 infra (discussing the case in detail).
12.
13.
See, e.g., Paul Davidson, Hot Commodity: Dot-Com Lists: Creditors' Asset of
Choice, NAT'L POST, Mar. 5, 2001, at E02, available at 2001 WL 14437954 (noting that
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This Article identifies and analyzes those questions.
Initially, it takes a descriptive and doctrinal approach to defining
the issue and discussing a court's likely resolution of it. Part II of
the Article begins by discussing what customer lists are, how
companies have traditionally used them, and how electronic
technologies generally-and the Internet specifically-offer new
possibilities for forming and exploiting databases of customer
information. It then describes the Toysmart case as just one
example of the tension between consumers' desires to control
dissemination of their personal information (particularly when a
site has promised not to disclose it), and sites' creditors' interests
in maximizing the value of the site's business.
In Part III, the Article examines how traditional bankruptcy
law would address the Toysmart case. The heated rhetoric that
characterized discussions of that case obscured important legal
questions about how a court would apply the Bankruptcy Code's
statutory wording. This Part argues that bankruptcy law as
traditionally interpreted is likely to permit the sale of customer
information even over an otherwise enforceable promise of nondisclosure. However, it also discusses options that a court might
apply to avoid what it views as an inequitable result.
Part IV considers whether the likely result under
bankruptcy law is desirable from a policy perspective. It argues
that the law should seek to improve market efficiency (primarily
by informing consumers of what data the site collects and how
the data is used), and also to decide whether some information
should be inalienable. The Article critiques existing proposals for
consistency with these goals. It concludes by making its own
suggestions for legislative change to implement a system of
privacy protection that will strike the appropriate balance
between a consumer's desire for privacy and an e-commerce
firm's need to raise money and maintain freedom of action.

Walt Disney agreed to pay Toysmart $50,000 to destroy its customer list and commenting
on similar litigation that has arisen subsequent to the Toysmart case); Stephanie
Stoughton, Toysmart.com List to Be Destroyed, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 30, 2001, at D7,
available at 2001 WL 3916848 (noting that the bankruptcy court approved destruction of
the customer list in return for "a payment of $50,000 from BVIG-T, a Walt Disney

subsidiary").
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II. THE PROPERTY AND CONTRACT LAW OF CUSTOMER LISTS
A.

Customer Lists Then and Now-Are They Property?

1. What is a Customer List? One may search the reported
cases and treatises in vain for a definition of "customer list,"
perhaps because the term is self-explanatory. A customer list is
literally just that-a list of customers. More elegantly, such a list is
a compilation of information about customers. However, this
simplicity of definition obscures the heterogeneity of customer lists.
They may be more or less detailed, containing simply basic
information like names and addresses, or exhaustive data on a
customer's financial position and shopping preferences.
New technology makes the existence of the latter,
comprehensive-and more valuable-list more likely. For
example, database software enables sellers to engage in
relatively sophisticated data mining even when consumers shop
in traditional bricks and mortar stores. 14 Supermarkets often
offer discounts to customers who use a frequent shopping card at
the checkout counter."6 In return for these discounts, the
customer, knowingly or not, enables the market to track her
purchasing patterns. 6 The market can then engage in more or
less sophisticated target marketing based on assumptions its

14. See ANNE WELLS BRANSCOMiB, WHO OWNS INFORMATION 19-20 (1994)
(describing traditional industries that are using databases to identify potential customers
based upon certain characteristics).
15. See Lisa Jane McGuire, Comment, Banking on Biometrics: Your Bank's New
High-Tech Method of IdentificationMay Mean Giving Up Your Privacy, 33 AKRON L. REV.
441, 442 n.5 (2000) ("More than half of all grocery stores in the United States offer
discounts and incentives to their shoppers if the shoppers participate in the frequent
shopper, or loyalty card, programs."); Domingo R. Tan, Personal Privacy in the
InformationAge: Comparisonof Internet DataProtectionRegulations in the United States
and the European Union, 21 LOy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 661, 661 n.4 (1999) ("Even
people who pay cash for groceries, in exchange for saving a few cents on a tube of
toothpaste or a six-pack of soda, sign up for and use 'discount cards' that grocery stores
use to track their buying and spending habits."); Christine Anthony, Note, Grocery Store
Frequent Shopper Club Cards: A Window into Your Home, 4 B.U. J. SC. & TECH. L. 7,
paras. 4, 7 (1998) (explaining that supermarkets offer discounts to shoppers with frequent
shopper cards); see also BRANSCOMB, supra note 14, at 19-20 (discussing "point-of-sale
data collection" and the associated mountains of data waiting to be "mined" that reveal
behavioral patterns).
See Anthony, supra note 15, at paras. 4-5 (describing frequent shopper club
16.
card technology); see also BRANSCOMB, supra note 14, at 19 (explaining that shoppers use
frequent shopper cards voluntarily, but may be unaware of the ways the store uses the
cards); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1474 (2000)
("[L]oyalty programs can allow merchants to amass detailed information about their
customers.").
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software makes from the revealed purchasing precedent.17 The
supermarket may also make the information it has obtained
available to others. 8
The more specific the information-whether gathered online
or offline-the more valuable it is in helping advertisers and
sellers meet consumers' needs more effectively. 9 The online
environment makes gathering detailed data easier. "Software
tools available to online retailers allow them to compile
sophisticated dossiers on surfing habits of customers on their
sites. Through such tools, Amazon.com and other e-tailers learn
customer preferences and target individual shoppers with
customized screen offerings. " " Technology can also allow e-tailers
to use customer information to implement "dynamic pricing," a
euphemism for price discrimination based on purchasing
preferences and demographic information.2 Further, a new
See BRANSCOMB, supra note 14, at 20 (giving examples of target marketing,
17.
including sending information about baby products to those who use their frequent
shopping cards while buying diapers at the grocery store); Anthony, supra note 15, at
paras. 6-7 (describing internal use of frequent shopper club databases as part of a
.measured marketing" plan); McGuire, supra note 15, at 442 n.5 ("[S]tores can... target
their coupons to specific customers, based on the customers' buying habits.").
18.
See Anthony, supra note 15, at para. 12 ("[Manufacturers will pay the
supermarket to use the grocery purchase database to target the manufacturer's customer
incentives."); see also Munro, supra note 8 (noting that America Online does not turn
customer information over to advertisers but does itself send ads to consumers who match
profiles established by advertisers).
19.
See Dana Hawkins & Margaret Mannix, Privacy is Under Siege at Work, at
Home, and Online, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., Oct. 2, 2000, at 62, availableat 2000 WL
7718850 (labeling information as the "hottest commodity" on the Web, and noting that it
has value because it can be cross-referenced, used in target marketing, and sold).
20.
Martinez, supra note 4. The Internet enhances the ability to aggregate data, in
part because a merchant can track a Web site's visitor's path regardless of whether that
visitor ever makes a purchase. Senator Kerry stated that the Internet is different from
supermarkets and catalog companies:
[W]hen I go to the shopping mall and look at five different sweaters but don't
buy any of them, no one has a record of that. If I do the same thing online,
technology can record how long I linger over an item, even if I don't buy it.
Likewise, I can pick up any book in a book store and pay in cash and no one will
ever know my reading preferences. That type of anonymity can be completely
lost online.
Statements on IntroducedBills, supra note 4 (statement of Sen. Kerry).
Jill Morneau, Dynamic Pricing: Who Really Wins?, CMP TECHWIRE, Sept. 29,
21.
2000, available at 2000 WL 2668566 (noting that e-commerce software increasingly offers
features enabling dynamic pricing, and defining that term as "gauging a shopper's desire,
measuring his means, and then charging accordingly. It supplies retailers with
information that allows them to price goods according to customers' demographic and
spending data."); see also Martinez, supranote 4 ("In well-off neighborhoods, for example,
department stores often charge more for the same goods than in outlets in poorer areas.
The Internet, of course, is different. The vast databases of Internet retailers like Amazon
create the possibility of targeting prices directly to individuals, based on their billing
information and purchasing history."). Customers charged Amazon.com with engaging in
dynamic pricing by charging repeat customers more for DVDs than new customers.
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standard software protocol allows fast and easy transfer of
customer files from e-tailers to data mining companies that
specialize in profiling.22
The aggregate information collected by a site about a
particular customer may be broadly classified into two categories:
"ask and answer" and transaction generated.' A site obtains "ask
and answer" information when a customer provides responses to
questions or requests information." Unlike "ask and answer"
information, transaction generated information is generally
collected without the customer's knowledge using a device like a
"cookie" that tracks a customer's movements on a site or the
Internet generally.25
Technology thus has enabled a new breed of "customer list"
unlike any business has known before. The new lists are
relatively easier to gather, contain much more information than
traditional lists of names and addresses, and are simply
maintained, manipulated, and transferred.2 6 They are also much
more valuable than the bare-bones lists of the past. The law must
consider who "owns" that value, and what the permissible means
of appropriating it are. As part of that inquiry, the law must
define the nature of the customer list, deciding whether or not it
falls within the "property" paradigm.

Morneau, supra. See also Martin Stone, Amazon.com Calls Price Test 'A Mistake,'
NEWSBrES, Sept. 28, 2000, available at 2000 WL 27300716 (stating that Amazon.com
offered discounts from 20% to 40% to certain customers, and refunded money to almost
7000 customers who did not receive the lowest price). Amazon.com claims that it offered
the differing prices as part of a random selection process, not as a result of analyzing
customer data. See Martinez, supra note 4.
Customer Profile Exchange, a group chaired by IBM, developed an XML
22.
standard that allows the easy exchange of large amounts of information, including
demographic information. See Patricia Jacobus, Privacy Advocates Wary of DataSharing Standard, CNET NEWS.Com, (Dec. 7, 2000) (stating that the standard has
been "endorsed by [approximately] 90 companies" and does not limit the amount or
type of information that can be included), available at http://news.cnet.com/news/01005-202-4043622.html; Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Internet FirmsAct to Ease Sharingof
Personal Data, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2000, at El, available at 2000 WL 29919779
(explaining how data mining companies can assist firms by mining the data and
combining it with other data from different sources for better perspectives on
customers).
23.
See Ji Y. Park, Note, Consumer Privacy and Bankruptcy-Should "Never"
Always Mean Never?, at 6 (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (citing
Seth Safler, Between Big Brotherand the Bottom Line: Privacyin Cyberspace, 5 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 6 para. 29 (2000)).
See id.
24.
25.
See id. at 8.
26.
Refer to note 18 supra and accompanying text (discussing the transferability of
databases on the Internet). See also Shadid, supra note 8 (noting the wide range of
information Internet customer lists can generate, including data on individuals' salaries,
cars, number of children, and hobbies).
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2. Is a Customer List Property, and, if so, Whose Property is
It? Generally, the law defines property as "valuable rights or
interests [in a thing that are] protected by law."27 The essential
rights include: "(1) the right to exclude; (2) the right to transfer; and
(3) the right to possess and use."28 The objects in which property
rights may inhere "embrace] everything which has exchangeable
value... includ[ing] obligations, rights, and other intangibles as
well as physical things."29
It seems, though, that any particular object may be more or
less "property." A person may still have a property interest in an
object even though she does not possess all of the rights-to
exclude, transfer, possess and use-normally associated with
unfettered ownership." For example, courts generally consider
trade secrets to be property.3 The rights attached to such
27.
73 C.J.S. Property § 4-5, at 165, 167-68 (1993); see also 63C AIM. JUR. 2D
Property § 1, at 66-67 (1997) (' [Piroperty' refers not to a particular material object but to
the right and interest in an object. 'Property' in a thing does not consist merely in its
ownership or possession, but also in the lawful, unrestricted right of its use, enjoyment,
and disposal. In its precise legal sense, property is nothing more than a collection of
rights.").
28.
JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW § 1.03 [B][1], at 4-5

(2000).
29.
63C AMl. JUR.2D, supranote 27, § 4, at 69-70.
30.
SPRANKLING, supra note 28, § 1.03[B][2]-[4], at 5-6 ("Is the right to exclude a
necessary component of property? Not at all.... Is the right to transfer essential? No....
The right to possess and use is a common-but not a necessary-component of property.").
31. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001-04 (1984) (holding
that a trade secret embodies a property right protected by the Fifth Amendments Takings
Clause, and stating, "Trade secrets have many of the characteristics of more tangible
forms of property. A trade secret is assignable .... A trade secret can form the res of a
trust,... and it passes to a trustee in bankruptcy.... This general perception of trade
secrets as property is consonant with a notion of 'property' that extends beyond land and
tangible goods and includes the products of an individual's 'labour and invention.")
(citations omitted); Unistar Corp. v. Child, 415 So. 2d 733, 734 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
("These listings qualify as trade secrets, are the property of the employer, and cannot be
used by the former employee for his own benefit."); Outside Carpets, Inc. v. Indus. Rug
Co., 185 S.E.2d 65, 68 (Ga. 1971) ("A trade secret is a property right which the courts will
protect by restraining its divulgence by one who has acquired it through confidential
relations with the discoverer thereof."); Rice Researchers, Inc. v. Hiter, 512 So. 2d 1259,
1268 (Miss. 1987) ("Trade secrets are property and rights therein are protected."); UltraLife Labs. v. Eames, 221 S.W.2d 224, 233 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949) ("[S]ecret formulas and
processes are property rights which will be protected by injunction."); Spiselman v.
Rabinowitz, 61 N.Y.S.2d 138, 140 (N.Y. App. Div. 1946) ("Trade secrets are property and
their preservation will in proper cases be shielded by the courts against unauthorized
disclosure."); In re Continental Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Tex. 1998) ("ITirade
secrets are an important property interest, worthy of protection."); Microbiological
Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 696 (Utah 1981) ("A trade secret, whether it be a
secret formula, process, pattern, device, compilation of information or otherwise, is under
the majority view held to be property, with power in the owner thereof to make use of it to
the exclusion of the world or to deal with it as he pleases."). Note, however, that not all
commentators agree that trade secret law implements a property rights regime. See
Pamela Samuelson, PrivacyAs Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1153-55 &
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property do not, however, include an absolute right to exclude. A
trade secret's owner may not exclude others from using the secret
if they obtained it through proper means such as "reverse
engineering' or independent development.32 This intangible
property then, while still property, endows its owner with a less
extensive bundle of rights than, for example, those that inhere in
property like a patent33 or tangible property like
other intangible
34
realty.
Where do customer lists fit in this spectrum of property?
Neither state nor federal law accords a person an exclusive right
in his or her name, address, or phone number." While some
statutes and regulations place certain limits on the disclosure of
credit and other information, these sources of law do not, by their
terms, create a property right in that information." Nor does any
n.148 (2000) (discussing the "ongoing debate about the exact nature of the rights
underlying" trade secret law, and siding with those who would argue that trade secret law
is premised on a notion of commercial morality rather than property law); see also Robert
G. Bone, A New Look At Trade Secret Law: DoctrineIn Search Of Justification,86 CAL. L.
REv. 241, 253-60 (1998) (discussing and rejecting property theory as a justification for
trade secret law).
32.
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1-2 (amended 1985), 41 U.L.A. 437-38, 449
(1990 & Supp. 2001) (protecting a trade secret owner against "[a]ctual or threatened
misappropriation" but defining misappropriation in a way that excludes obtaining the
secret by independent development, reverse engineering or other "proper" means); Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155 (1989) ("The public at large
remain[s] free to discover and exploit [a] trade secret through reverse engineering of
products in the public domain or by independent creation."); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) ("A trade secret law, however, does not offer protection
against discovery by ... so-called reverse engineering, that is by starting with the known
product and working backward to divine the process which aided in its development or
manufacture."); see also Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1002 (noting that "the extent of the
property right [in a trade secret] is defined by the extent to which the owner of the secret
protects his interest from disclosure to others.... Information that is public knowledge or
that is generally known in an industry cannot be a trade secret.... If an individual
discloses his trade secret to others who are under no obligation to protect the
confidentiality of the information, or otherwise publicly discloses the secret, his property
right is extinguished.").
33.
Under the Patent Act, the patentee has the "right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States ...
." 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994). The patentee is protected even against another's
independent development of the same invention. See also Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 155;
Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 484-90 (explaining why trade secret protection is weaker than
patent protection).
34.
Property rights in real property are among the most extensive. Maureen A.
O'Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the Internet: In Search of an Appropriate
Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561, 562 & n.1, 563 (2001).
35.
See generally Samuelson, supra note 31, at 1131 (stating that "the law does not
generally recognize the legal right of individuals to control uses or disclosures of personal
data").
36.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681a-1681t (1994 & Supp. V 2000) (setting forth the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, Title VI of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, which requires that
agencies providing consumer credit reports adopt certain procedures targeted, in part, to
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set of laws afford a consumer ownership of rights in her
observable shopping or browsing patterns. If the individual has
no property rights in the relevant information, how can a firm,
simply by aggregating data about a large number of individuals,
morph what is not property into property?37 Both property theory
and trade secret law may provide at least a partial answer.
The law often grants property rights in scarce items of value
to encourage individuals or firms to use resources efficiently
and/or to engage in socially valuable conduct-like that of
creating a new product. 8 As already noted, the customer list can
be a compilation of considerable value." It may also be "scarce" in
the sense that it is difficult for a second firm to replicate
another's customer list without having access to it. Granting a
business property rights in a customer list encourages it to
expend resources to accumulate customer information, create the
aggregate list, and use the list to serve customers more
effectively."
That the law often accords customer lists property-type
rights is evident by the number of cases holding them to be trade

respecting consumers' privacy). The recently enacted Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act imposes
certain obligations on institutions that extend credit to provide their customers with
statements explaining their privacy policies. Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§ 501-503, 113 Stat.
1436-39 (1999) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6803). Federal regulations limiting
the disclosure of medical information have also recently gone into effect. See Standards
for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462 (Dec. 28,
2001). See also Samuelson, supra note 31, at 1130-32 (discussing various legal rules
which may prevent disclosure of certain information, and stating, "however intuitively
powerful the notion of property rights in one's data may be, it is clear that in the United
States the existence of some legally protectable interests in personal data in certain
circumstances is not equivalent to a legal rule that a person has a property interest in
one's personal data").
37.
See Samuelson, supra note 31, at 1133 & n.41 (noting that such data
aggregators will have a stronger argument in favor of property rights in the resulting
database if Congress passes some version of the database protection legislation that it has
been considering for some time).
38.
See SPRANKLING, supra note 28, § 1.04[A], at 7, § 2.05[A], at 17-18 (explaining
that concepts of value and scarcity help partially to account for property law, and
discussing economic utilitarianism, the prevailing justification for property rights in
American law).
39.
See, e.g., Dwyer v. American Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (IM. App. Ct.
1995) ("The more names included on a list, the more that list will be worth. However, a
single, random cardholder's name has little or no intrinsic value to defendant [credit card
companies] (or a merchant). Rather, an individual name has value only when it is
associated with one of defendants' lists. Defendants create value by categorizing and
aggregating these names. Furthermore, defendants' practices do not deprive any of the
cardholders of any value their individual names may possess.").
40.
See Samuelson, supra note 31, at 1126-27 (observing that data is helpful to a
firm in assessing how to enhance customer service and in its marketing efforts, thus
creating a motivation to develop and use lists).
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secrets.41 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret
as:
information, including a... compilation.., that: (i) derives
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable through proper means by, other persons who
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.42
Many customer lists compiled by e-tailers are likely to fit this
definition. They derive at least part of their value from not being
known to competitors and are usually the subject of reasonable
efforts to maintain their secrecy.
Treating a customer list as property of the firm that
compiles it accords with commercial understanding and legal
precedent. Firms have always considered customer lists property,
using them to raise money by offering them as collateral for
secured loans, or selling or licensing them outright. In turn,
various sets of laws-including laws on secured transactions and
bankruptcy-have reinforced the "property-like" nature of
customer lists.
Generally, a state's implementation of Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governs secured transactions.43
Article 9 applies to "any transaction... intended to create a
security interest in personal property."4 Cases often hold security
41. See, e.g., Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C & C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053,
1063 (2d Cir. 1985) ("A customer list developed by a business through substantial effort
and kept in confidence may be treated as a trade secret and protected at the owner's
instance against disclosure to a competitor, provided the information it contains is not
otherwise readily ascertainable."); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Kitsonas, 118 F. Supp. 2d 848,
854 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (citing Ohio trade secret law in determining that the plaintiffs
customer list qualified as a trade secret); Heritage Benefit Consultants Inc. v. Cole, No.
CV001622705, 2001 WL 237240, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2001) ("A 'trade secret,'
includes 'information, including a... compilation, program ....
cost data or customer
list....'" (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-51(d) (West 2001))); Strata Mktg., Inc. v.
Murphy, 740 N.E.2d 1166, 1177 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) ("Strata's customer lists, which it
alleged take considerable effort, time, and money to compile, could be deemed a trade
secret and sufficiently secret to derive economic value."); Hayes-Albion v. Kubershi, 311
N.W.2d 122, 126 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that a customer list constitutes a trade
secret), affd in part, rev'd in part,364 N.W.2d 609 (Mich. 1984).
42.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 41 U.L.A. 438 (1990).
43.
See U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a) (1999) ("IT]his Article applies (a) to any transaction...
intended to create a security interest in personal property."); see also U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(1)
(2000) (revised) [hereinafter Revised Article 9] ("[Tlhis article applies to: (1) a
transaction.., that creates a security interest in personal property."). Revised Article 9
will become law on July 1, 2001, in those states that have adopted it. See Robert W. Ihme,
On the Road to Revised Article 9: Some Potholes to Avoid, UCC BULLETIN, July 2001, at 1.
44.
Refer to note 43 supra.
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interests in customer lists to be governed by Article 9, classifying
the lists as general intangibles, a species of personal property.45
Likewise, bankruptcy cases decided under the federal
Bankruptcy Code46 (Code) include "customer lists" in the debtor's
estate, which is itself comprised of property.47
That bankruptcy law would include customer lists within the
estate is not surprising.48 Although the Code leaves the definition
of "property" to other state or federal law,49 its wording evinces
an intent to include as much as possible in the bankruptcy
estate; it defines the estate to include "all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property..

,,."
This wording reflects

bankruptcy law's goal of maximizing the size of the estate

45.
See, e.g., In re Roman Cleanser Co., 802 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding
that a grant of a security interest in general intangibles effected an assignment of
goodwill, including customer lists, under Michigan's implementation of the Uniform
Commercial Code); In re Emergency Beacon Corp., 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 766
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("[Platent rights, tradename, customer lists, books and records... are
general intangibles within the meaning of § 9-106 of the Uniform Commercial Code.");
John C. Minahan, Jr. & Bryan G. Handlos, Scope ofArticle 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 390 PLI/PAT 205, 212 (1986) ("Property such as customer lists... ha[s] been held
to be [a] general intangible[, obtaining an interest in which is subject to Article 9."); Dan
L. Nicewander, GeneralIntangibles Under Revised Article 9, 54 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP.
169, 170 (2000) (classifying customer lists under the former Article 9 as within the "catchall category of miscellaneous general intangibles," and reviewing the definition of general
intangibles under Revised Article 9). Revised Article 9 should also classify customer lists
as general intangibles. See id. (showing that, although the definition of "general
intangibles" in Revised Article 9 has been narrowed, customer lists remain within its
scope).
46.
11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1994). The Internal Revenue Service also considers
customer lists to be intangible property. See I.R.C. § 936 (h)(3)(B)(v) (1994) (defining
"intangible property" to include customer lists).
47.
See, e.g., In re El Paso Refinery, L.P., 196 B.R. 58, 70-71 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1996) (citing a foreclosure order including customer lists among general intangibles); In re
Collated Prods. Corp., 121 B.R. 195, 197 (Bankr. D. Del. 1990) (reciting customer lists as a
general intangible asset owned by the corporation), affd, Collated Prods. Corp. v. United
Jersey Bank Cent., N.A., 937 F.2d 596 (3d Cir. 1991); In re Mid-West Motors, Inc., 82 B.R.
439, 442 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) ("Insurance expirations (i.e., customer lists and the right
to solicit renewals or replacements) covered by agency agreements are general
intangibles."); In re Davies Ins. Serv., Inc., 33 B.R. 252, 252-54 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983)
(holding that customer lists are a form of insurance expiration, which is most properly
classified as a general intangible).
48.
Indeed, the Senate's version of a new bankruptcy bill assumes that customer
lists are property. Refer to note 206 infra and accompanying text (illustrating that the
Senate's new bill supports assertions that current law would include customer lists in the
bankrupt's estate and allow them to be sold despite any previous promise not to do so).
49. See Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 398 (1992) ("In the absence of any
controlling federal law, property and 'interests in property' are creatures of state law.")
(citations omitted); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979) ("Congress has
generally left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to
state law.").
50.
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
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available for distribution to creditors.5 Thus, any asset that has
value constitutes property of the estate. 2 This may account for
the courts' custom of treating customer lists as property of the
estate; such lists have value that the trustee can realize through
a sale and distribute to the estate's creditors. Thus, the law has,
at least at times, been willing to accord such lists property-like
rights even though they do not fit easily within all of the
conventional definitions of property. Customer lists then are
probably generally "property," and almost certainly "property"
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.
3. The Toysmart Customer List. The Toysmart saga is not an
unusual one in the dot-coin world. Its business model-the online
sale of educational toys and toys that assist in child developmentinitially attracted considerable attention and financing. 3 Disney
invested a significant sum in Toysmart with some initial success."'
Indeed, during the 1999 Christmas selling season, Toysmart was the
twenty-fourth most visited site, with more than a million hits and $6
55
million in sales occurring in December 1999 alone.
Like many dot-coins, however, Toysmart fell on hard times
early in the year 2000.56 It complained that Disney simply could
not keep up with the speed of the Internet. 7 Disney also changed
51.
The Historical and Revision Notes of the statute clarify that section 541(a) is an
all-embracing definition, and explain that the addition of 541(a)(7) makes "any interest in
property that the estate acquires after the commencement of the case.. . property of the
estate" to further show the far reaching effect of this section. See id. § 541.
52.
See id.
53.
See Glenn R. Simpson, FTC Is Set to Challenge Toysmart.com to Prevent the
Sale of Consumer Data, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2000, at A3, available at 2000 WL-VSJ
3035811 (noting that Disney invested over $45 million in the business and dominated the
board seats of Toysmart.com); Stephanie Stoughton, Toysmart.com Shutting Its Online
Doors, Investor Interest Fails Disney-Backed Retailer, BOSTON GLOBE, May 23, 2000, at
El [hereinafter Toysmart.com Shutting Its Online Doors], available at 2000 WL 3327541
(describing the products offered by Toysmart.com as being Disney-based educational
toys).
54.
See Simpson, supra note 53.
55. Id.
56.
See Toysmart.com Shutting Its Online Doors, supra note 53 (stating that
Toysmart, Inc., folded at the end of May 2000 due at least in part to the growing number
of Web sites devoted to children's toys, the failure of investors to consider Internet
companies, and Disney's reexamination of its focus on the Internet). The first Internet etaler bankruptcy occurred in May 2000, when Craftshop.com filed in Chapter 11. See
Tamara Loomis, Amazon Revamps its Policy on Sharing Data,N.Y.L.J., Sept. 21, 2000, at
5. A number of others went out of business shortly thereafter. See Victoria Slind-Flor,
Privacy or Creditors:Who Holds the Trump?, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 4, 2000, at Al (listing dotcoms going out of business, and stating that forty-one had shut down by August 8, 2000);
see also Luis Salazar, FTC Takes Action, NAVL L.J., Oct. 9, 2000, at B6 (citing
expectations for a "deluge of Internet bankruptcies" and an estimate that as many as 75%
of e-tailers will fail).
57.
Online Toy, Craft Stores Face Survival of the Fittest, IVINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL
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its online strategy to focus on entertainment and leisure products
and less on e-commerce goods like Toysmart's
At the same
time, competitive pressure began to exact a toll on e-tailers
generally. Online retailers often spend more money on
advertising to place their names before the public than
established bricks and mortar stores. 9 This reality, along with
shipping costs that may increase the price to consumers over
those charged in the "real" world, can put e-tailers at a
competitive disadvantage."
The high "burn rate" that
characterizes Internet retailing coupled with the probability that
many e-tailers would not turn a profit in the foreseeable future,
began to make it difficult for them to continue raising money
from venture capitalists." Investors began fleeing dot-coins,
making it financially unattractive for Toysmart to pursue an

initial public offering of stock.62 Stock market jitters coupled with
Disney's strategy shift made it difficult for Toysmart to raise the
money it needed to remain in business. 3 By May 19, 2000,
Toysmart had laid off substantially all of its employees, and its
creditors filed an involuntary petition in bankruptcy on June 9,
2000.64
At the time of its bankruptcy, Toysmart listed assets totaling
about $10.5 million and liabilities of $29 million.65 Its primary
STAR TRIB., June 11, 2000, at 01D, availableat 2000 WL 6976290 (stating that Toysmart
complained that Disney's timetable was too slow in the Internet world).
58. See id.
59. See Toysmart.com Shutting Its Online Doors, supra note 53 (noting a Forrester
Research report predicting that large advertising costs and competition will drive many etailers out of business by the end of 2001).
60. See generally id. (observing that established retail stores, such as Wal-Mart
Stores Inc. and Toys "R" Us Inc., are competing online with new, and unfamiliar dot-coin
companies).
61. See Online Toy, Craft Stores Face Survival of the Fittest, supra note 57
(indicating that investors are less willing to take a risk on the Internet industry because
of e-tailers' rapid consumption of funds).
62. See id. (indicating that the investors are no longer eager to gamble on the
Internet industry because of recent dot-coin failures).
63. See Toysmart.com Shutting Its Online Doors, supra note 53 (noting that, when
investors began to back away from dot-coins and Disney "reconsidered its Internet
strategy," the company was unable to recover and obtain financing).
64. See Toysmart.com, L.L.C., Petition #:00-13995 (setting forth a chronology of the
case), available at http/216.251.228.60/Pages/toysmart_docket.htm (last visited Oct. 26,
2000); see also Toysmart.com Shutting Its Online Doors, supra note 53 (reporting that
many of Toysmart's 170 employees were packing boxes on May 22, 2000).
65. See In re Toysmart.com, L.L.C., Case No. 00-13995-CJK Motion for Authority to
Sell Inventory by Private Sale Free and Clear of Liens, Claims and Encumbrances (D.
Mass. filed June 23, 2000) fhereinafter Motion for Authority to Sell Inventory]; In re
Toysmart.com, L.L.C., Case No. 00-13995-CJ-K, Debtor's Motion for Authority to Sell
Assets (Excluding Inventory) by Public Sale Free and Clear of Liens, Claims and
Encumbrances(D. Mass. filed June 23, 2000) [hereinafter Debtor'sMotion]
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assets included its inventory, leases, equipment, Internet
infrastructure, intangibles (like its source code, Web site and
business plan), and its customer list.66 Toysmart estimated the
value of its tangible property at close to $8 million.67 It identified
its "extensive customer database" as having an "unknown"
market value." The database included information "on about
250,000 individuals;" other firms have sold larger databases for
about $210,000.69 The list contained information including "name,
address, billing information, shopping preferences, order history,
gift registry selections, [and] family profile information about
consumers' children, such as name, gender, birthday, and toy
interests."7' Toysmart sought to sell the list as part of its
bankruptcy estate.71 While such sales are routine in the offline
context, the Toysmart case involved an explicit promise
distinguishing it from the garden variety case. Unlike most
bricks and mortar retailers, Toysmart had a privacy policy posted
at its site that promised:
Personal information voluntarily submitted by visitors to
our site, such as name, address, billing information and
shopping preferences, is never shared with a third party.
All information obtained by toysmart.com is used only to
personalize your experience online... When you register
with toysmart.com, you can rest assured that
72 your
information will never be shared with a third party.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a complaint, and
the attorneys general of a number of states intervened in the
bankruptcy proceeding.7 3 The FTC argued that disclosing the
66.
See Motion for Authority to Sell Inventory, supra note 65; Debtor'sMotion, supra
note 65.
67.
See In re Toysmart.com, L.L.C., Case No. 00-13995-CJK, Statement of Financial
Affairs, Schedule of Personal Property (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000) (listing an estimated
market value of $7,586,000 for various items including inventory, supplies, and
warehouse equipment).
68.
Id.
69.
Matt Richtel, Toysmart.com in Settlement with F.T.C., N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
2000, at C1, C14.
70.
In re Toysmart.com, L.L.C., Case No. 00-13995-CJK, Stipulation and Order
Establishing Conditions on Sale of Customer Information (D. Mass. filed July 20, 2000)
[hereinafter Stipulation and Order], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/
toysmartbankruptcy.l.htm (last visited July 9, 2001).
71.
See Toysmart.com's Planto Sell Consumer Data is Challenged by FTC,WALL ST.
J., July 11, 2000, at C8 [hereinafter Toysmart.com's Plan is Challenged], availableat 2000
WL-WSJ 3035966.
72.
F.T.C. v. Toysmart.com, L.L.C., Civ. Action No. 00-11341-RGS, FirstAmended
Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief para. 8 (D. Mass. filed
July 21, 2000) [hereinafter FirstAmended Complaint], availableat httpV'ww.ftc.gov/us/
2000/07/toysmartcomplaint.htm (last visited July 12, 2001).
73. See Toysmart.com's Plan is Challenged, supra note 71 (reporting that the FTC
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information in light of Toysmart's promise would be a deceptive
practice violating section 5(a) of the FTC Act.74 The states'
attorneys general sued under their respective state consumer
protection acts. 75
The FTC reached a settlement with Toysmart under which
Toysmart could only sell the information as part of its goodwill,
and only to a "Qualified Buyer."76 The proposed settlement
defined "Qualified Buyer" as "an entity that (1) concentrates its
business in the family commerce market, involving the areas of
education, toys, learning, home and/or instruction, including
commerce, content, product and services, and (2) expressly agrees
to be Toysmart's successor-in-interest as to the Customer
Information, and expressly agrees to [certain other] obligations..
S.,
As FTC Commissioner Mozelle Thompson saw it, a sale
under these terms would be consistent with Toysmart's privacy
policy because the purchaser would definitionally stand in
Toysmart's shoes."
Others disagreed. FTC Commissioner Orson Swindle argued
that limiting the sale to a Qualified Buyer did not adequately
protect consumers' privacy interests, particularly because of
Toysmart's promise:
If we really believe that consumers attach great value to
the privacy of their personal information and that
consumers should be able to limit access to such
"object[ed] to ... plans to sell information about its customers after promising them it
would not"); Stephanie Stoughton, States Weigh in on Toysmart Privacy Case, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 26, 2000, at C1 [hereinafter States Weigh In], available at 2000 WL 3336111
(relating that thirty-eight state attorneys general opposed the Federal Trade
Commission's settlement with Toysmart.com permitting the sale of its customer list).
74. First Amended Complaint, supra note 72, at paras. 16-18; see also D. Ian
Hopper, Groups CriticizeAmazon Policy, AP ONLINE, Sept. 1, 2000, availableat 2000 WL
25992933 (noting that deception arising from the privacy policy formed the heart of the
FTC's complaint). The FTC also alleged that Toysmart had violated the Children's Online
Privacy Protection Act by collecting personal information from children without providing
notice to parents or obtaining their consent. FirstAmended Complaint,supra note 72, at
paras. 19-20. This Article concentrates only on that information that Toysmart collected
without violating any non-bankruptcy law.
75. See Ted Bridis, FTC Staff FavorsPactto PermitSale of Toysmart List, WALL ST.
J., July 21, 2000, at B2, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 3037347; Stipulation and Order,
supranote 70.
76. Stipulationand Order, supranote 70.
77. Id. A Qualified Buyer would have to agree to the Stipulation's conditions,
manage the information under the provisions of Toysmart's Privacy Policy, and use the
information only to complete orders and to individualize a consumer's shopping
experience. Id. Any change in the policy would require prior notice to consumers and
would only apply to information collected after the policy change unless the consumer
otherwise agreed. See id.
78. Statement of Commissioner Mozelle W. Thompson, Toysmart.com, Inc., File No.
X000075, availableat http'J/ww.ftec.gov/os/2000/07/toysmartthompsonstatement.htm.
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information through private agreements with businesses,
we should compel businesses to honor the promises they
make to consumers to gain access to this information...
"[N] ever" really means never. 7-9
TRUSTe, the independent privacy seal program of which
Toysmart was a member, objected to the settlement because it
did not "sufficiently protect the promise embodied in the
Toysmart privacy statement and Toysmart's contractual
obligation as a participant in the TRUSTe Program.""0 The states'
attorneys general did not endorse Toysmart's settlement with the
FTC because it did not require Toysmart to obtain express
permission from its customers before releasing their data.'
Finally, the bankruptcy judge indicated that she shared the
states' concerns and would likely not approve the settlement."
The question, however, became moot when Toysmart withdrew
the database from sale because the bids were too low.83 Disney
later agreed to buy and destroy the list, ending the case.'
The Toysmart case raised a number of fundamental questions
that are likely to recur, and to which this Article now turns.5 These
79.
Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Orson Swindle, Toysmart.com,
Inc., File No. X000075 (dissenting), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/
toysmartswindlestatement.htm.
80.
In re Toysmart.com, L.L.C., Case No. 00-13995 CJK, Objection of Trusted
Universal Standards in Electronic Transactions ("TRUSTe") to Motion to Approve
Stipulation (D. Mass. filed Aug. 3, 2000). Toysmart's sale would breach its obligation
under its agreement with TRUSTe to give "(1) notice of changes in the use and disclosure
of users personally identifiable information 0 to customers and (2)... an opportunity to
choose not to agree to a new use or disclosure of their information." Id.
81.
States Weigh In, supra note 73 (citing fears about the harmful effect this
settlement could have on consumers and the Internet); see also Linda Rosencrance, States
Formally Object to Proposed Settlement Between Toysmart and the FTC,
COMPUTERWORLD, Aug. 4, 2000 (noting that forty-four states objected to the settlement),
availableat http://vww.computerworld.com/cwi/story/0,1199,NAV47-ST048208,00.html.
82.
Stephanie Stoughton, Judge Disputes FTC Settlement on Web Store Database,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 27, 2000, at E5 [hereinafter Judge Disputes FTC Settlement].
83.
Id.; see also Tom Kirchofer, Web Info Not For Sale-ForNow, BOSTON HERALD,
July 27, 2000, at 028 (noting that bids for the database ranged from $15,000 to $50,000).
84.
Refer to note 13 supra.
85.
See Alex Pham, Net Store to Sell Its Customer List, Move Alarms Privacy
Advocates, BOSTON GLOBE, July 1, 2000, at Al (discussing Boo.com's sale of about
350,000 customers' data to Fashionmall.com in bankruptcy and Craftshop.com's
desire to sell its customer list in bankruptcy even though it had promised not to);
Greg Sandoval, Failed 'Dot-Coms'Selling PersonalConsumer Data, L.A. TIMES, July
1, 2000, at C1 (explaining that Craftshop.com viewed its sale of customer information
to be permissible despite a promise to the contrary because the purchaser bought
Craftshop's name); Susan Stellin, Dot-Com LiquidationPut Consumer Data in Limbo,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2000, at C4 (discussing the case of Living.com in which the
bankruptcy court in Texas endorsed a sale of customers' names and e-mail addresses
to multiple parties, "as long as consumers could opt out"); see also Press Release,
Office of the Attorney General-State of Texas, Cornyn Asks Delaware Judge to
Block Sale of Customer List (April 16, 2001) (reporting the Texas Attorney General's
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issues include considering whether or not a privacy policy is a
contract and, if so, whether a provision against resale of a
customer's information in that contract is enforceable. If it is
enforceable, the further question of deciding whether its breach may
be remedied at law or only through specific performance arises.
Analyzing these questions under contract law is the first step
toward assessing what a bankruptcy court would have said had the
Toysmart case proceeded to conclusion. As the bankruptcy analysis
will reveal, even if contract law regards the promise as an
enforceable obligation, the trustee may break that promise and sell
the data. The aggrieved customers may then file a claim against the
estate.
B. ContractualAspects of Customer Lists: Contractinto Property
1. Is the Toysmart Privacy Policy a Contract, the Breach of
Which is Remediable?: From Common Law to ProCDto UCITA. Was
Toysmart's promise a binding contractual obligation not to disclose
its customers' information? Contractual analysis addressing this
question has developed over time.
Under the early common law, contract developed into two
forms-bilateral and unilateral." Both require the presence of a
bargain or at least the form of a bargain to create an enforceable
contract. 7 When the parties each exchange a promise with the
other, they form a bilateral contract."' The Toysmart privacy policy
might be part of a bilateral contract if Toysmart promised not to
reveal the information it received from a customer in return for her
promise to provide it." When one party exchanges a promise in
return for an act by the other, the parties together create a
unilateral contract. 90 If Toysmart were promising not to transmit the
information to anyone else in return for the customer's act of

request that a Delaware bankruptcy court not permit the sale of eToys.com's
customer list before conducting a hearing), available at http://vww.oag.state.tx.us/
newspubs/releases/2001/20010416etoys.htm.
86.
See, e.g., 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 21 (1963)
(distinguishing between unilateral and bilateral contracts); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 2.3 (3d ed. 1999) (describing and differentiating bilateral and unilateral
contracts).
87. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 86, §§ 2.2-2.3 (explaining that both bilateral and
unilateral contracts "meet the bargain test").
88. See id. § 2.3 ("Such contracts are often called 'bilateral' contracts because
promises are made on both sides.").
89. Refer to text accompanying note 72 supra (quoting the language of the online
retailer's privacy policy).
90. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 86, § 2.3 ("Sometimes the consideration for a
promise is some performance by the promisee, as when a seller delivers apples in return
for a buyer's promise to pay at the end of the month.").
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providing it, the privacy policy might be part of a unilateral
contract.
Traditionally, both the bilateral and unilateral forms of
contract require the existence of a bargain whose subject is either
a benefit or a detriment.9 In Toysmart, the bargain is difficult to
see. Was the customer really bargaining for the benefit that
Toysmart not release the information? Was Toysmart bargaining
for a benefit-the information? Toysmart as the bargaining party
seems an easier conclusion given the relative bargaining power of
the parties. If this were the case, presumably the customer
obtained the benefit of a personalized shopping experience along
with the ability to purchase goods from Toysmart with the
assurance that Toysmart would not sell information about the
customer to someone else. Thus, the customer improved her
position, assuming that such a promise is enforceable. Was the
customer, however, really bargaining for these benefits?
In reality, the Toysmart customer may never have read, let
alone bargained for, the privacy policy. Click-through rates to
online privacy policies are notoriously low.92 In the absence of a
bargain, traditional contract law would not regard the promise
against disclosure of customer information as a contractual
obligation.93
As technology (beginning with the printing press and
advancing to the typewriter, photocopy machine, and word
processor) made form contracts feasible, the courts adapted
contract law to hold that mere opportunity for a party to be
aware of the terms was sufficient to bind the party to those terms
even if the party never read them. The terms, however long and
complicated, would be on the form signed. Later, sellers placed
terms directly on the product, making them available for review
at the point of purchase.
Whether the click-through to the privacy policy was part of
the purchasing process or was only on a Web page containing
general information, would make little difference under this
analysis. The term would not be part of the form signed or on the
product purchased. However, a court might say that the privacy
policy would be incorporated into the contract by reference when
91. See id. § 2.2 (referring to the "traditional requirement that the consideration be
either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee...").
92. The privacy policy of Americangreetings.com, a company with 8.1 million
visitors during August 2000 alone, has a click-through rate of only 0.009 percent. Rory J.
O'Connor, Trading Net Privacy at E-Checkout, INTERACTIVE WEEK FROM ZDWIRE, Sept.
11, 2000, at 10, availableat 2000 WL 4068131.
93. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 86, §§ 2.6, 2.10 (explaining that a bargain is
absent when the promisee performs independently of the promise).
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the policy is available during the purchasing process, even if only
by clicking-through.
More recent and controversial contract formation theories
might consider the privacy policy to be part of the contract even if
the click-through were not a part of the purchasing process. Some
recent cases and proposed legislation embody these theories that
seem to discard traditional legal requirements.
94 and Hill v. Gateway 2000,
In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg
Inc., the Seventh Circuit held the customer to terms that were
not available for review when the product was purchased or
ordered. In the former case, ProCD marketed a CD-ROM that
contained a digital phone directory and search and retrieval
software.9 6 The box in which the CD was enclosed stated that
terms of use appeared within the box.97 More specifically, ProCD
printed the terms in a manual placed in each box, and also
presented the user with the terms on the screen each time the
user ran the software." The Seventh Circuit held that "ProCD
proposed a contract that the buyer [accepted] by using the
software after having an opportunity to read the license at
leisure."" Thus, the license bound the buyer who did not return
the software and thereby reject the proposed terms."0
Unlike the defendant in ProCD who purchased the goods
over the counter, the customer in Hill had ordered a computer by
phone.0 1 The box the customer received on delivery contained
detailed contractual terms, including a requirement to resolve
any dispute by arbitration. 2 The court held that the parties
formed a contract (including the arbitration provision) when the
customer kept the computer beyond the return period specified in
terms that appeared in the box.0 3 If the customer were
94.
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
95.
105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
96. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449-50 (describing ProCD's product and its business model).
97. Id. at 1450 ("Every box containing [ProCD's] consumer product declares that the
software comes with restrictions stated in an enclosed license.").
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1452 (emphasis in original).
100.
See id. at 1452-53 (explaining that consumers who discover terms after
purchase can "prevent formation of the contract by returning the package"). At issue in
the case was a provision stating that the purchaser could use the data only for noncommercial purposes. Id. at 1450. The defendant ignored this use restriction and made
the database available on the Internet for a fee. Id. The court upheld the use restriction
under contract law and also held that the Copyright Act did not preempt enforcement of
the provision. Id. at 1449, 1454-55.
101.
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1148-50 ("By keeping the computer beyond [the period allowed for
return], the [plaintiffs] accepted Gateway's offer, including the arbitration clause.").
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dissatisfied with the terms she may have found enclosed with the
shipment, she should have rejected the computer and shipped it
back to Gateway within the contractually specified time.'
A number of courts have adopted the ProCD/Hill view of
contract formation, particularly in cases involving computers.'
However, the Seventh Circuit's decisions are not so limited.
Indeed, the court emphasized that its rationale applies to all
contracts, not just those involving software or other high-tech
goods.10 6
In essence, the same court held in both ProCD and Hill that
the contract did not come into being until the customer had an
opportunity to find additional terms in the box, regardless of
whether the customer actually read those terms. If the customer
did not agree with the terms, she could return the product, but
only within the reasonable time stated by those terms with which
she disagreed. The court did not address the irony of holding a
customer to a return period contained in contractual terms with
which she disagreed. It did, however, discuss the fairness of
postponing the time of contract formation until the customer had
an opportunity to find the proposed terms. In ProCD,the outside
of the box indicated that terms were contained within. In Hill,
the court emphasized that the customer could have learned from
advertisements or from general information on the Internet that
the vendor was not proposing to form a contract when the
product was ordered but at some later time.0 7 In short, the Hill
court stated that the terms of the offer included statements made
in general advertisements that support services and a warranty
104.

Id.

105.
See, e.g., Westendorfv. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 16913, 2000 WL 307369, at "1
(Del. Ct. Mar. 16, 2000) (upholding an arbitration provision shipped with a computer);
Rinaldi v. Iomega Corp., No. 98C-09-064-RRC, 1999 WL 1442014, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct.
Sept. 3, 1999) (holding a warranty disclaimer included inside computer Zip drive
packaging to be enforceable); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1998) (following the decision of the Hill court in upholding an arbitration
clause); Levy v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 1060, 1062 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1997) (deciding to uphold the validity of the arbitration agreement proposed by
Gateway and tacitly accepted by the consumer); see, e.g., M.A. Mortenson Co. v.
Timberline Software Co., 998 P.2d 305, 307 (Wash. 2000) (following Hill and ProCD in
holding a shrink-wrap license enforceable). But see Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp.
2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000) (rejecting Hill and ProCD).
106. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149 ("Plaintiffs ask us to limit ProCD to software, but where's
the sense in that? ProCDis about the law of contract, not the law of software.").
107. Id. at 1150 (rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that their case was
distinguishable from ProCD because "the box containing ProCD's software displayed a
notice that additional terms were within, while the box containing Gateway's computer
did not"). The court stated that the Hills knew that the box contained additional terms
because ads said so, and the Hills could have learned the terms by requesting them from
Gateway, consulting public sources, and/or inspecting the contents of the box. Id.
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also came with the product."8 The customer could have realized
from this information that other terms, such as a requirement for
arbitration, would also come later.9
The ProCD and Hill rationale argues for incorporating
Toysmart's privacy policy into its contract with customers. The
customers had an opportunity to become aware of the policy's
provisions. Toysmart presented it on the site, and the TRUSTe
seal that Toysmart displayed at its site told customers that
Toysmart had a privacy policy.110 Customers agreed to the policy
by ordering goods from Toysmart. Under ProCDand Hill, this act
of ordering a product with an opportunity to know the provisions
of the privacy policy seems to be enough to incorporate the terms
into the contract. Certainly, if those cases and their progeny
permit the inclusion of contractual terms disadvantageous to the
customer in the bargain, they should equally allow inclusion of
favorable terms. Indeed, the Toysmart case presents a stronger
case for inclusion of the terms of the privacy policy in the
contract than either ProCD or Hill. In those cases, the customer
could not even discover the terms until she was already in
possession of the product. In Toysmart, the terms were available
for review prior to purchase.
Proposed legislation that would govern transactions in
computer information also, by analogy, supports the conclusion
that Toysmart formed a contract with its customers that included
the privacy policy. The drafters of the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act (UCITA)"' have abandoned even
the pretense of retaining the common law form of a bargain as a
condition of contract formation. In its place, they seem to have
substituted the concept of authentication" of a record" by
108.

Id.

109.
See id. ("[Tlhe Hills knew before they ordered the computer that the carton
would include some important terms. .. ").
110.
See TRUSTe, The TRUSTe Program: How It Protects Your Privacy ("A
cornerstone of our program is the TRUSTe 'trustmark,' an online branded seal displayed
by member Web sites. The trustmark is awarded only to sites that adhere to established
privacy principles and agree to comply with ongoing TRUSTe oversight and consumer
resolution procedures."), at http://www.truste.org/consumers/users-how.html (last visited
July 31, 2001).
111.
UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT, 7 U.L.A. 6 pt. II (1997 & Supp.
2001) [hereinafter UCITA], available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/
cital0st.htm. This uniform act has, to this date, been adopted and is currently in effect in
only two states-Virginia and Maryland. UCITA Online, What's Happening to UCITA in
the States, at http://www, ucitaonline.comlwhathap.html (last modified Apr. 6, 2001).
112.
UCITA § 102(a)(6) ("Authenticate' means: (A) to sign; or (B) with the intent to
sign a record, otherwise to execute or adopt an electronic symbol, sound, message, or
process referring to, attached to, included in, or logically associated or linked with, that
record.").
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electronic means. Under section 208, entitled "Adopting Terms of
Records,"
(1)
A party adopts the terms of a record, including a
standard form, as the terms of the contract if the
party agrees to the record, such as by manifesting
assent.
(2)

The terms of a record may be adopted pursuant to
paragraph (1) after beginning performance or use if
the parties had reason to know that their agreement
would be represented in whole or part by a later
record to be agreed on and there would not be an
opportunity to review the record or a copy of it before
performance... or use begins ....

(3)

If a party adopts the terms of a record, the terms
become part of the contract without regard to the
party's knowledge or understanding of individual
terms in the record... .14

Under section 209, however, if a "mass-market license "1 ' or a
copy thereof is not available for review before the licensee. 6
becomes obligated to pay, and the licensee does not agree to the
terms after review, the licensee may, in effect, cancel the
transaction.'1 7
UCITA, at first glance, does not appear to be quite as
gorgonesque as Hill. Under UCITA, while the parties form a
contract at once even if terms are not available, once those terms
become available, a party who objects to them may cancel the
contract. The question, however, is what it means for terms to be
"available for review." Section 112 provides that:

113. Under section 102(a)(54), "'[riecord' means information that is inscribed on a
tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in
perceivable form." Id.
114. Id. § 208 (emphasis added).
115. "'Mass-market license' means a standard form used in a mass-market
transaction." Id. § 102(a)(43). A mass-market transaction includes, among other things, "a
consumer contract." Id. § 102(a)(44).
116. The Act defines a "[1]icensee" as, inter alia, "a person entitled by agreement to
acquire or exercise rights in, or to have access to or use computer information...." Id. §
102(a)(41).
117. Id. § 209 ("A party adopts the terms of a mass-market license... only if the
party agrees to the license, such as by manifesting assent, before or during the party's
initial performance or use of or access to the information.... If a mass-market license or
a copy of the license is not available in a manner permitting an opportunity to review by
the licensee before the licensee becomes obligated to pay and the licensee does not agree,
such as by manifesting assent, to the license after having an opportunity to review, the
licensee is entitled to a return .... ).
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A person has an opportunity to review a... term only if
it is made available in a manner that ought to call it to the
attention of a reasonable person ....
If a... term is available for review only after a person
becomes obligated to pay or begins its performance, the
person has an opportunity to review only if it has a right to
a return if it rejects the record."'
Arguably, the contract in Hill met this standard. Generally,
a seller's engaging in broad advertising or providing information
on the Internet should call a term (or at least a way to get it) to
the attention of a buyer.
UCITA would not apply to the purchase of toys over the
Internet because its scope is restricted to transactions in
computer information."' However, its view of contract formation
is nonetheless instructive as evidencing increasing acceptance of
at least some version of the ProCD and Hill views. Like ProCD
and Hill, UCITA argues that even if the customer did not know
of Toysmart's policy, the customer and Toysmart were still bound
to it as a contractual obligation. That the law binds the customer
to any Toysmart policy of which she could have been aware gives
the customer the benefit of policies of which she could have been
totally unaware.
If the Toysmart privacy policy is part of the contract between
Toysmart and its customer,12 then the customer has a right to
sue for damages in the event of Toysmart's breach. Contract law
traditionally measures damages according to the aggrieved

118.

Id. § 112.

119.
Id. § 103(a).
120.
If the privacy policy is not a part of the contract under either a traditional or
more modern analysis, it might provide the basis for a claim of promissory estoppel. The
law might say that the parties did not enter into a contract but rather that Toysmart

made a promise on which the customer relied to her detriment. But where is the reliance
and what is the detriment? The customer "gave" information to Toysmart in reliance on
Toysmart's promise not to release it to anyone else. But the common law would find it
difficult, if not impossible, to hold Toysmart to the promise. Equitable relief in the form of
an injunction or specific performance is rare in contract actions, and rarer still in cases of
promissory estoppel. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 86, § 12.4 ("[Alithough the injured
party can always claim damages for breach of contract, that party's right to specific relief
as an alternative is much more limited."); id. § 2.19 (discussing the Restatement Second of
Torts section 90, which "states that [in cases of promissory estoppel] recovery 'may be
limited as justice requires,' language that is generally invoked in limiting recovery to
damages based on the reliance interest"). Toysmart would break its promise, whether it
arose in contract or promissory estoppel, and the customer would only have a right to sue
for damages. See id. § 12.4 (explaining that traditional remedies in contract tend to be
substitutional rather than specific).
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party's expectancy.'' If the aggrieved party could not prove her
expectancy, she might recover reliance or restitution damages.'2 2
How does one measure the dollar value of the customer's
expectancy in Toysmart's promise not to release the customer's
information? 23 Reliance damages also seem an unlikely remedy.
What has the customer lost in reliance on the promise?
Restitution is even less promising. Toysmart cannot "give back"
the customer's name or its value.'24
When damages do not compensate a party for loss, a court
may grant an injunction or specific performance.'2 5 A court could
enjoin Toysmart from releasing the information or, in the
alternative, order it to perform specifically by living up to its
promise. To succeed in obtaining an injunction, however, the
plaintiff traditionally must prove irreparable harm. What is the
harm? Presumably, Toysmart would be selling the list to another
business. Even if Toysmart were selling the list to a
merchandiser that did not specialize in toys or children's items,
where is the irreparable harm?2 . A customer could argue that
she is harmed because a promise made to her about matters she
considers private was about to be broken. But the difficulty in
calculating damages and the lack of harm, however, make
practical enforcement of the commitment difficult.
The most promising argument for the customer may be that
where money damages are difficult to calculate, a court should

121.
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 86, § 12.1 ("Howdo courts encourage promisees to
rely on promises? Ordinarily they do so by protecting the expectation that the injured
party had when making the contract by attempting to put that party in as good a position
as it would have been had the contract been performed ....").
122.
In promissory estoppel cases, courts have traditionally awarded reliance
damages. For a general description of promissory estoppel see id. § 2.19.
123.
If you agree to sell me a product for $100, and, when you breach the contract, I
have to pay $150 on the market, my damages are easy to prove-$50. It cost me $50 more
to get what you had promised to sell me for $100. It is much more difficult to determine
the damage from disclosure of customer information because the information lacks a
readily ascertainable market value, and the customer cannot elsewhere purchase the
promise not to disclose. Refer to note 39 supra (quoting a case stating that a consumer
does not lose the value in her name because a credit card company rents it to a vendor).
124.
This point illustrates the lack of the customer's property right in her
information. If the information were property, the customer's exclusive right to possess it
might persuade a court to allow the customer to recapture her information from the
transferee. The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) adopts this approach
without using the term "property." 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 2000). It
permits a parent to recapture data transferred to a Web site by a child in violation of
COPPA. Id.
125.
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 86, § 12.6 (explaining that under traditional
contract law, equitable relief can be granted when damages are inadequate).
126.
The situation might be different if Toysmart were going to sell the list to, for
example, some pornographic group.
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order specific performance.'
In this case, specific performance
would be equivalent to injunctive relief because it would require
enforcement of the promise not to disclose the information.
Unlike injunctive relief, however, the specific performance
remedy does not require the plaintiff to prove irreparable harm."'
At common law, it is the appropriate remedy when the subject
matter of the contract is "unique."'2 9 The customer could argue
that the set of information specific to her (for example, her name,
address, phone number, and shopping patterns) is unique to her,
justifying enforcement of the promise. Such a customer could find
additional support for her argument in the philosophy of the
UCC. The UCC accords a buyer specific performance under
circumstances in which money damages are difficult to measure
and/or unlikely to be fully compensatory."0 The customer may
have some measure of success in arguing that anything other
than specific performance will be under-compensatory because
any other remedy fails to protect the value (likely subjective) that
she places on her personal information and the promise not to
disclose it.
2. Contract into Property--Is an Anti-alienation Clause
Enforceable? The discussion above assumes that a contractual
theory exists to remedy the breaking of a promise to maintain
privacy. But the promise itself may not even be enforceable. Indeed,
the history of the common law suggests that a customer could not
stop a sale of her information despite a promise to the contrary, and
she may not even be entitled to either damages or a grant of specific
"'
performance as a remedy for breach of that promise.13
127. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 86, § 12.6 (stating that equitable relief is
appropriate when loss "cannot be estimated with sufficient certainty").
128. See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
16-1 (3d ed. 1987) (indicating that specific performance is granted when the plaintiff
demonstrates the inadequacy of the "remedies of damages and restitution").
129. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 86, § 12.6 (indicating that specific performance is
available as a remedy in the case of unique goods).
130. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a court may award an aggrieved buyer
specific performance when "the goods are unique or in other proper circumstances."
U.C.C. § 2-716 (1999). The comments indicate that specific performance is appropriate
when the buyer has an inability to "cover"- i.e., to make a substitute purchase in the
market. Id. § 2-716 cmt. 2.
131. Refer to notes 120-30 supra and accompanying text (explaining that, because of
the difficulty in determining damages for the consumer whose information is sold in
violation of the privacy policy, a satisfactory legal remedy might not be available). Not
every broken promise warrants a remedy, and sometimes, even when a remedy seems
warranted, circumstances may prevent its availability. The plaintiff who cannot prove
damages or the "other proper circumstances" necessary for equitable relief under the most
lenient of standards may have a right without a remedy. The Toysmart shopper may be in
this group.
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Early common law viewed a contract as a very personal
relationship, requiring the plaintiff to be in privity with the
defendant as a condition of permitting a suit under the contract
to proceed.132 Someone not a party to the promises exchanged or
obligations incurred could not sue on the contract that embodied
these promises or obligations.'33 A mid-nineteenth century case in
New York,' however, broke the magic of the privity spell. No
longer was the privacy or privity between two parties to a
contract something almost sacred."' For the first time, a third
party could acquire rights under a contract despite having had no
contact with either of the principals involved in the formation of
the contract.'36 For over fifty years, the New York and other
courts struggled with the idea of persons who were not part of a
contract having rights under it.' 37 In some areas the struggle
continues, although in the commercial setting the law has largely
abandoned the requirement of privity. 3 ' It is here that one can
most vividly see the transformation of contract rights into
property rights.
Section 9-318(4) of the UCC and its accompanying comment
4 most dramatically illustrate this trend. Section 9-318(4) states:
A term in a contract between an account debtor and an
assignor is ineffective if it prohibits assignment of an
account or prohibits creation of a security interest in a
general intangible for money due or to become due or
requires the account debtor's consent to such assignment or
security interest. 39
Comment 4 explains:
Subsection (4) thus states a rule of law which is widely
recognized in the cases and which corresponds to current
business practices. It can be regarded as a revolutionary
132. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 86, § 10.2. Interestingly, an early definition
of "privity," now obsolete, was "privacy." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 672
(2d ed. 1949). In current usage it can mean "private knowledge; joint knowledge of a
private matter." Id.
133.
See 13 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 37:1
(Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2000) ("Under the traditional common-law rule, only parties
in privity of contract could sue on the contract ...
134.
Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
135.
See id. at 271, 274 (allowing a third party beneficiary to a contract to "maintain
an action" on the contract).
136.
Id. at 274-75. In this case, A owed money to C. B promised A to pay the money
to C. C was allowed to enforce the promise against B.
137.
WILLISTON, supra note 133, § 37:1 nn.6-7.
138.
See, e.g., LEN YOUNG SMITH ET AL., SMITH AND ROBERSON'S BUSINESS LAW 457
(5th ed. 1982) (explaining that most states have followed the UCC's lead and no longer
require privity of contract in breach of warranty cases).
139.
U.C.C. § 9-318(4) (1999).
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departure only by those who still cherish the hope that we
may yet return to the views entertained some two hundred
years ago by the Court of King's Bench.140
Although this section and its comment only relate to the right to
assign or transfer to another the right to collect money from a
third person, it is nonetheless instructive that the UCC makes
ineffective a contract term that would restrict transfer. 4 ' Thus, if
Z buys goods from X on credit, X may assign his right to collect
the debt to Y even if Z had bargained for X's promise not to
assign this right. This, of course, may be inconvenient for Z if, for
example, X were located in the same town where Z lives and Y is
in another state. Nevertheless, privity gives way to commercial
necessity. Contract becomes property because commercial
necessity in the form of the credit economy demands it.
Duties, however, are not so freely delegable. UCC section 2210 states in part:
(1)
A party may perform his duty through a delegate
unless otherwise agreed or unless the other party has a
substantial interest in having his original promisor perform
or control the acts required by the contract. No delegating
of performance relieves the party delegating of any duty to
perform or liability for breach.
(2)
Unless otherwise agreed all rights of either seller or
buyer can be assigned except where the assignment would
142
materially change the duty of the other party ....
Comment 3 to 2-210 states in part:
Under subsection (2) rights which are no longer executory
such as a right to damages for breach or a right to payment
of an "account" as defined in the Article on Secured
Transactions (Article 9) may be assigned although the
agreement prohibits assignment. In such cases
4 3 no question
involved.'
is
performance
any
of
delegation
of
These sections and comments make clear that, so long as no duty
of performance is involved in assignment, the "aggrieved" party
may not prevent assignment.'4
140. Id. at cmt. 4 (emphasis added). This section and comment appear in the pre2000 revision to the UCC. Id. Revised Article 9 § 9-406(d) repeats the rule but the drafters
dropped the dramatic phrasing of the pre-revision comment. Id. Apparently, some 50
years after the original Code was drafted, commercial parties take the assignment of
rights-at least in a commercial setting-for granted.
141. U.C.C. § 9-318(4).
142. U.C.C. § 2-210 (1999).
143. Id. at cmt. 3.
144. Id.
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These Code sections reflect the trend against barring
assignment of rights and even show the corresponding trend
toward allowing delegation of duties without prior agreement.'
Contract, in a commercial sense, and at a certain point-when
duties are fully performed and only rights remain-becomes
property. As such, it is a valuable asset of the person holding the
rights created by contract. From Toysmart's creditors'
perspectives, it is a saleable right. It is property.
However, from customers' perspectives, even if the aggregate
database of customer information is Toysmart's property,
Toysmart does not have the full "bundle of rights" associated
with property. 6 Toysmart, by contract, gave away its right to sell
the property.'4 7 Thus, it has neither a contractual right nor
property to transfer to its creditors. Toysmart's promise, in effect,
created a non-delegable duty. Toysmart has a continuing duty to
perform by refraining from disclosing the customer's information.
Whether a court would accept this argument, particularly in light
of the commercial trend allowing assignment and delegation even
over contractual promises restraining alienability, is an open
question. That the customer does not have a property right in her
information will not help her case-the obligations binding
Toysmart are based in contract, not property law. This is not to
say that rights of privacy have no place in the law. It is only to
say that the common law, as presently constituted, and without
statutory supplement, does not provide the wide ranging
protection that many people today assume is their right.
In summary, this promissory relationship between Toysmart
and its customer is probably not a contract under traditional law
unless the customer is aware of the promise and acts because of
it.' Under more modern contract law trends, the awareness of
the customer has less legal relevance, making it more likely that
a court would hold that the customer receives the benefit of the
promise even if not expressly aware of it. If there is a contract
and hence an obligation on the part of Toysmart to keep the list
145.
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 86, §§ 11.2, 11.4 (discussing the movement away
from the common law bias against assignment of rights towards unrestricted
assignability in the UCC and elsewhere).
146.
See SANDRA H. JOHNSON ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 70 (2d ed. 1998) (describing the rights associated with the bundle of sticks as
including "the right to exclude, the right to transfer, the right to use and the right to
possess").
147.
Refer to text accompanying note 72 supra (quoting Toysmart's privacy policy).
148.
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 86, § 2.10 ("Even if the promisee takes some
action subsequent to the promise,.., and even if the promisor sought that action in
exchange for its promise..., that action is not bargained for unless it is given by the
promisee in exchange for the promise.").

2001]

BANKRUPTCYLAWV. PRIVACYRIGHTS

807

private, the customer will still face difficulty in obtaining a
remedy. Dollar damages would be difficult to calculate, and a
lack of irreparable harm makes a court's issuance of an
injunction unlikely.' The customer's best argument is that the
promise creates a non-delegable duty, and breach of the
contractual provision may only be remedied through an order of
specific performance. The customer, does, however, face the
additional risk that a court would find the anti-alienability
provision unenforceable. Upholding such a restriction would be to
move back from the trend in commercial law allowing the free
assignment of rights and would likely have to rest on some
conception of privacy not yet established in American law.'
If there is a promise that is not part of a contract, it is either
a gratuitous, unenforceable assurance by Toysmart, or an
obligation that may be enforceable by the customer on a theory of
promissory estoppel if the customer relied on the promise. 5'
Again, however, damages seem incapable of estimation, and
equity (in the form of specific performance) traditionally does not
intervene in promissory estoppel cases.'
III. THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF CUSTOMER LISTS
A.

The TraditionalTreatment of Customer Lists in Bankruptcy

1. ContractAspects-Section 365. In the Toysmart case, both
participants" 3 and commentators 4 suggested that contract law
149. Refer to notes 120-30 supra and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of
determining damages for breach of a privacy contract).
150. Fragmented statutory enactments and FTC recommendations to Congress
foreshadow an emerging concern over privacy in an age where electronic innovations
make tracking consumer information and behavior effortless and imperceptible. See
PreparedStatement of The FederalTrade Commission on "RecentDevelopments in Privacy
Protections for Consumers" Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade, and Consumer
Prot. of the House Comm. on Commerce (Oct. 11, 2000) (statement of Robert Pitofsky,
Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission) (referring to recent privacy protection laws,
especially The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
of 1999), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/1O/pitofskystatement.htm.
151. See Sonsino, supra note 8 (stating that a privacy policy may be a contract or an
"implicit, non-binding corporate policy"); refer to note 120 supra (evaluating the
promissory estoppel argument).
152. Refer to notes 120-30 supra and accompanying text (explaining the difficulty of
calculating damages for the breach of a promise to keep a person's information private
and noting the rarity of specific performance in cases of promissory estoppel).
153. See, e.g., In re Toysmart.com, L.L.C., No. 00-13995 CJK Objection of Trusted
Universal Standards in Electronic Transactions ("TRUSTe") to Motion to Approve
Stipulation (D. Mass. filed Aug. 3, 2000).
154. See, e.g., Marian Newsome, Privacy and Failing Dot.Coms: A Case Study of
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might protect customers' rights. However, even if there were a
contract, the Bankruptcy Code provides for the assumption or
rejection of executory contracts. 15 5 An executory contract is one in
which a more than perfunctory performance remains incomplete by
each party to the contract. 1, 6 In the Toysmart case, because the
customer had fully performed her part of any contract by providing
her personal
information to Toysmart, the "contract" would not be
1 57
executory.
The question of how bankruptcy law would treat a nonexecutory contract then arises. Logic might seem to indicate that
the bankruptcy trustee would automatically assume Toysmart's
unperformed obligation to keep the customer's information
private; if one side has fully performed, then the other should
fulfill its obligation and do the same. In reality, however, the
opposite is true. As bankruptcy law's most famous commentator
and scholar, Professor Vern Countryman, pointed out, if the nondebtor party in a bankruptcy proceeding has fully performed,
then it is presumed that the debtor will reject the contract.5 The
Bankruptcy Code simply does not give the debtor an option.
Requiring the debtor to fully perform, when it has already
Toysmart.com, SANS INST. (Dec. 20, 2000), at http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/privacy/
failing.htm.
155. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1994).
156. The Bankruptcy Code itself does not define "executory." The legislative history
points to Professor Vern Countryman's definition as embodying Congress' intent when it
used the word in the statute. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 347 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6303; S. REP. No. 95-989, at 58 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5844; Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: PartI, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 439, 460 (1973) (defining as executory "a contract under which the obligation of both
the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure
of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the
performance of the other"). The U.S. Supreme Court, in N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco, adopted this
definition in footnote 6. 465 U.S. 513, 523 n.6 (1984).
157.
A minority school of thought in the bankruptcy field opines that a contract
should be considered executory so long as the debtor has "unperformed duties that the
trustee may elect to perform or breach." 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.02[1], at 36519 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 1979); see also Nashelsky, supra note 9 (stating
that the contract might be executory under a "result oriented" approach that labels as
"executory" "a contract whose treatment as executory yields a result consistent with the
policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code"). Nashelsky contends that under this definition,
"a bankruptcy court might find the privacy policy to be an executory contract(s) because
the sale of the customer list, a primary asset of the debtor's estate, would further the
Bankruptcy Code policy of maximizing creditor recoveries." Id. Nashelsky, however,
seems to assume that if a contract is not executory, it remains in some legal limbo. This
conflicts with the Countryman view discussed in the text. If one adopts the Countryman
view, as this Article does, there is no need for the "result oriented" approach to the
definition of executory contract. Regardless, if a court were to find the contract
"executory" under one of the various definitions, the trustee would reject it.
158.
See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY, supra note 157, 365.02, at 365-17 to 365-18
(citing Professor Countryman).
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received the full performance of the other party to the contract,
59
would deplete the estate in contravention of bankruptcy policy.
Decreasing the size of the estate in this way would also be unfair
to other creditors who are unlikely to receive the full value of the
performances promised to them once the debtor is in bankruptcy.
The other party to the contract, who has fully performed, has a
claim against the debtor's estate, but no right to the debtor's full
performance.1 6
In some circumstances, the Bankruptcy Code provides
special treatment for persons who have partially or fully
performed their contracts with the debtor. For example, a lessee
in possession of the debtor's real property may not be evicted
even though the debtor rejects the lease. 6 ' The debtor/lessor,
however, may refuse to perform services required by contract,
and the lessee may deduct the reasonable value of such services
from the rent."2 This approach respects the property interest of
the non-debtor in remaining in possession of the property while
freeing the debtor from potentially onerous contractual
obligations.
Other examples of such special treatment exist. Section
365(i) allows a purchaser who has paid part of the contract price
and is in possession of realty to be conveyed by the debtor to
avoid eviction if she chooses to stay and fulfills her part of the
contract.'63 On the other hand, if she accepts the debtor's
rejection, she has a lien on the realty for the return of the price
she has paid.'
A licensee of intellectual property from a debtor/licensor may
keep and use the property even though the debtor rejects the
license. 65 As in the case of the lessee of realty,'66 the debtor may
159.

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY points out that to prevent a trustee from making a

mistake and assuming a contract in which only the debtor owes performance, section 365
of the Code provides only for the assumption or rejection of executory contracts. See id. If
the debtor has fully performed, and the other party has not, it is presumed that the debtor
will assume the contract to obtain the performance of the non-debtor party. Id. If the
debtor has not fully performed and the other party has, the debtor has in its estate all
that the contract can provide for the debtor. Id. It makes no sense to assume this latter
contract in which the debtor will receive no more and be obligated to perform. Id.
(indicating an underlying bankruptcy policy in assuming contracts is to maximize the
debtor's estate).
160. See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1994). When the debtor breaks a contract, the non-debtor
has a claim against the estate which may ultimately be paid in full, in part, or not at all,
depending on the value of the estate and the number and type of claims.
161. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h).
162. Id.
163. Id. § 365(i).
164. Id. § 365(j).
165. Id. § 365(n).
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refuse to perform services under the contract. However, the
licensee may not deduct the reasonable value of the services from
the license fees.'67
Finally, the debtor may not freely reject a collective
bargaining agreement. Instead, the debtor must first seek to
negotiate with the union and fulfill fairly complex statutory
requirements.16
These examples illustrate a simple point. The drafters of the
Bankruptcy Code knew how to create special rights that
impacted negatively on the value of the debtor's estate. That no
provision addresses rights of privacy could indicate that Congress
intended no such exception to exist. On the other hand, privacy
rights were not a "hot" topic until recently. The flurry of current
legislative activity6 9 to address privacy issues suggests that
Congress simply had no intent one way or the other because it
never thought about the issue. In such a case, however, courts
working with the statutory language should fulfill the principal
role of bankruptcy law-to enhance the value of the debtor's
estate. If this approach is correct, then the sale of a customer list,
promise or no promise, should create little difficulty in
bankruptcy, at least from a contractual perspective. 7 '
Refer to text accompanying notes 161-62 supra (noting the exception carved out
166.
of the Bankruptcy Code favoring lessees of a debtor's realty).
167.
In both cases the lessee or licensee may accept the rejection of the contract and
give up the realty or intellectual property. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h), (n).
168. Id. § 1113.
Refer to Part MV.C.1 infra (discussing only a few of the privacy bills introduced
169.
in Congress).
The leading treatise in the field states:
170.
Executory contracts and leases are considered a form of property of the estate.
As property of the estate, the debtor's interests in such contracts or leases are
protected against termination or other interference that would have the effect of
removing or hindering the debtor's rights in violation of section 362(a)(3).
362.03[5][a], at 362-21 to 362-22. For
3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 157,
relevant text of section 362(a)(3), see infra note 263 and accompanying text. Collier also
points out that "[s]ome courts have held that all contract rights of the debtor are property
of the estate, even when the contract is an executory contract that cannot be assumed or
assigned under section 365." 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 157, 362.0315][a],
at 362-23. The Collier reference to contracts that cannot be "assumed or assigned" is to
those very limited contractual rights and obligations that at state or federal law other
than bankruptcy law are made specifically enforceable by and against only the original
parties to them. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c); see also id. § 365(f)(1) (suggesting that even where
"applicable law" prohibits assignment, the contract may be assigned). While courts have
not followed a single theory to reconcile sections 365(c) and 365(f), a broad consensus
would appear to conclude that (f)(1) refers to a general or broad prohibition whereas (c) is
a prohibition very limited in its stated application. Even this statement may unfairly
simplify the variegated approaches taken by the courts. Both federal and state common
law and statutes influence the outcome. See, e.g., In re Catapult Entm't, Inc., 165 F.3d
747, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1999) (declaring that assignment of nonexclusive patent license held
barred by federal common law); Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d
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2. Property Aspects-Sections 541 and 363. The Bankruptcy
Code includes all of the debtor's property of every description in the
debtor's bankruptcy estate. 7 ' Moreover, bankruptcy law generally
disregards restrictions on the transfer of such property created by
nonbankruptcy law.17 2 Absent a special provision in the law
protecting privacy, it is doubtful that a traditional reading of the
Code would cause one to conclude that a mere promise is enough to
prevent the inclusion of a valuable asset in the estate. Additionally,
a court is unlikely to hold that whatever "interest" a customer has in
the aggregate list is sufficient to prevent its sale.
a. Section 541. Bankruptcy Code section 541(c) provides that
restrictions placed on transfers of property that might be
enforceable outside of bankruptcy are not enforceable as to property
of the debtor's estate.7 3 The only exception is for spendthrift
trusts. 7 4 As a prominent treatise points out:
Section 541(c)(1) further emphasizes the increased
independence of the Code from nonbankruptcy law
concerning property of the estate. In a sharp departure
from the former Act, section 541(c)(1) renders ineffective
restrictions or conditions on transfer.. . 'Personal' property
interests or 'personal' rights that may not be transferred
under federal or state law will nevertheless become property
of the estate.'75

489, 490-91, 495 (1st Cir. 1997) (upholding failure of licensor to prevent assumption by
debtor of nonexclusive patent license where proposed sale of debtor's stock to third party
would create de facto assignment); In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 680 (9th Cir. 1996)
(asserting that federal common law prohibiting assignment of nonexclusive patent
licenses barred assignment); In re James Cable Partners, L.P., 27 F.3d 534, 538 (11th Cir.
1994) ("A general prohibition against assignment does not excuse the City from accepting
performance from a third party within the meaning of § 365(c)(1)."); In re Magness, 972
F.2d 689, 696 (6th Cir. 1992) (concluding that a golf membership is not assignable
because of restriction in country club rules recognized by state law); In re West Elecs.,
Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1988) (declaring that an assignment by defense contractor of
contract between U.S. government and contractor barred by federal statute); In re Pioneer
Ford Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 1984) (reasoning that a Rhode Island statute
prohibiting assignment of dealer franchise barred assignment).
11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1994).
171.
172.
Id. § 541(c)(1).
173.
Id. ("Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection [dealing with trusts],
an interest of the debtor in property becomes property of the estate... notwithstanding
any provision in an agreement, transfer instrument, or applicable nonbankruptcy law(A) that restricts or conditions transfer of such interest by the debtor .. ").
174.
Id. § 541(c)(2) ("A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor
in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case
under this title.").
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 157, % 541.24, at 541-99 to 541-100
175.
(emphasis added).
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Thus, (i) if a customer list is property, and (ii) if the
individual customers whose names appear on the list have given
their names to Toysmart with a restriction on use, and (iii) even
if this restriction would be enforceable outside of bankruptcy, the
policy of the bankruptcy law reflected in section 541(c) is
nevertheless to make the list a part of the estate and hence
available for sale in the normal course. 7 6 This is not surprising. A
creditor is barred from any individual action against the debtor
by operation of the stay that comes into effect automatically on
the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 177 In place of an individual8
debtor."1
action, the creditor has a claim against the estate of the
b. Section 363. Under section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code,
The trustee may sell property... free and clear of any
interest in such property of an entity other than the estate,
only if-(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of
such property free and clear of such interest; (2) such entity
consents; (3) such interest is a lien and the price at which
such property is to be sold is greater than the aggregate
value of all liens on such property; (4) such interest is in
bona fide dispute; or (5) such entity could be compelled, in a
legal or equitable79proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction
of such interest.
The Bankruptcy Code includes all of the debtor's interests in
property in the estate and, furthermore, disregards restrictions
on the transfer of those interests. 8 ' However, while the Code
permits the trustee to administer property in which both the
debtor and others have interests, it does not always permit the
sale of that property free of others' interests.' Some have argued
176. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c). Arguably, section 541(c) is not even applicable to
Toysmart's case. That section speaks of "an interest of the debtor in property" as
becoming a part of the estate despite restrictions on transfer. Refer to note 173 supra
(quoting § 541(c)(1) in pertinent part). An individual customer has no interest in the
aggregate list that constitutes the property of the estate. Refer to Part mI.A.2.b infra
(discussing this argument under § 363). Thus, there is no transfer restriction applicable to
the "property," and § 541(c) does not apply.
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
177.
178. Id. § 502. See also id. § 101(5), (7), (10), (12)-(13).
Id. § 363(f).
179.
Refer to notes 173-76 supra and accompanying text (describing § 541(c) of the
180.
Bankruptcy Code).
Refer to note 11 supra. The Code uses "estate" and "property" in two senses181.
property as the thing itself with all interests (the debtor's and others') or property as the
debtor's interest in the thing (the res). "Estate" includes the interests of the debtor and
others for purposes of administration. If the debtor has an interest in something, and
either possesses or has a right to possession at the time of the bankruptcy petition, the
trustee will administer it (the res). See, inter alia 11 U.S.C. §§ 554, 704 (1994); see also
United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198 (1983). However, "estate," as relating to the
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that customers have an "interest" in their personal information,
and that none of the enumerated provisions of section 363(f)
authorizes a sale of that information free of that interest.'82 This
conclusion is, however, debatable.
First, under traditional interpretations of the Code, the term
"interest" means a property right.18 ' Part II above discussed the
customer's lack of a property right in her own name, address, and
other personal information. Thus, for the argument that the
customer has an interest in the list and the information therein
to survive, "interest" must mean or include something other than
the property interest that it has traditionally encompassed.
Second, the property to which section 363(f) refers is the
aggregate customer list."M Even if the law were to put aside its
usual focus on property interests under section 363 and hold that
a customer has an "interest" in her own information, it is
unlikely also to hold that the customer has an interest in the
aggregate list constituting the "property" that the trustee seeks
to sell. The aggregate customer list is more than the simple sum
of its parts. The debtor's ingenuity, innovation and effort in
compiling the list make it valuable. It is the list that has value,
not the information of one particular customer.'8 5 For these
reasons, an argument that a customer can thwart the sale of the
customer list under section 363 should fail.
value that belongs to the debtor, includes only the debtor's interest in the res as seen in
section 541(a). See id. § 541(a)(1) (including in an estate "all legal or equitable interests of
the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case") (emphasis added). The word
"estate" is used in that second sense here.
182. See Andrew B. Buxbaum & Louis A. Curcio, Note, When You Can't Sell to Your
Customers, Try Selling Your Customers (But Not Under the Bankruptcy Code), 8 AI.
BANKR. INsT. L. REv. 395, 409-22 (2000) (arguing that customers have a constitutionally
protected privacy interest in their information, discussing the application of section 363,
and arguing that it would preclude the trustee's sale of such data).
183. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (defining estate to include "all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in the property").
184. Refer to Part II.A.2 supra (emphasizing that cases decided under various sets of
law, including the Bankruptcy Code, have treated aggregate customer lists as "property").
185. Refer to note 39 supra (noting that a single consumer's information is valuable
only when combined with a database). Moreover, for the same reason, even if all of the
customers joined in a class action claiming individual interests in the list that collectively
would encumber the entire list, they would still be unable to share in the proceeds of the
list. If each customer has a zero property interest in her name and other information, and
hence has no interest in the customer list into which such information is inserted, then
100 customers also have no interest: 100 zeros still sum to zero. Of course, if one looks at
the problem from a valuation rather than strict logic perspective, if the company derives
value from the raw material of the customers' information, even if the company went to
the expense of assembling the data, some of the value of the raw material belongs to the
customers. Refer to Part IV.D infra (arguing that changes to bankruptcy law are justified
in part by permitting customers to appropriate some of the value that companies gain
from using their information).
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If the result under section 363 is clear, then what accounts
for the arguments of some commentators advocating a contrary
result under the same statutory section? Essentially, they
premise their arguments on a broad reading of section 363,
beginning with delineating the scope of an "interest." Lacking a
definition of the term "interest" in the Bankruptcy Code, courts
186
continue to struggle to give that term a precise meaning.
Courts have held that a restrictive covenant that runs with the
land is not an executory contract, but a property "interest" in
8 7 Thus, contract becomes
favor of those who enjoy its benefits."
property and, unless one of the clauses in section 363(f) applies,
the trustee may not sell the property free of that interest.
According to one court, the ultimate question in determining
whether an interest exists is whether the "obligation... [is]
connected to, or arise[s] from, the property being sold."188
Under this view, capable of a broad interpretation, a
Toysmart customer might argue that her contract with Toysmart
created a property interest in the customer's personal
information analogous to a real property covenant that runs with
the land. 9 According to this argument, although Toysmart owns
186.
See, e.g., In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d 573, 582 (4th Cir. 1996) ("It is
difficult to make... categorical observations concerning the intended meaning of the
words 'interest in'-indeed, the precise boundaries of the phrase likely will be defined only
as the courts continue to apply it to the facts presented in the cases brought before
them."); see also In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142, 161-62 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996) (summarizing
cases finding and refusing to find the existence of an "interest").
187.
See Gouveia v. Tazbir, 37 F.3d 295, 299 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that a covenant
that restricted a neighborhood to single family residential houses "establishes an ongoing
right of present (not merely future) enjoyment-the present right to have a commercialfree neighborhood. As noted by the bankruptcy court, restrictive covenants, like
restrictive easements, traditionally have been recorded on the title of the encumbered
property. While distinguishing between contracts and property rights may seem elusive,
the neighbors' present enjoyment of the right, their completion of performance noted by
both the bankruptcy and the district court, and the traditional treatment of their rights as
running with the land, all indicate to us that the... [clovenant is an interest in real
property. As such, § 365 of the bankruptcy code [which deals with executory contracts] is
inapplicable.") (emphasis in original); In re Dundee Equity Corp., 1992 WL 53743, at *1,
*4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that a stipulated settlement between the debtor and
its tenants created an interest in property preventing the sale of such property free of the
stipulation's requirements); In re 523 E. Fifth St. Hous. Pres. Dev. Fund Corp., 79 B.R.
568, 570-71, 576 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that a covenant requiring property to be
used as low income housing created an "interest," and that no subsection of 363(f)
authorized sale of the property free of that interest); see also In re Fleishman, 138 B.R.
641, 644-46, 648 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992) (holding that a right of first refusal was an
executory contract, not a property interest, because it did not run with the land).
188.
Folger Adam Sec., Inc. v. Dematteis/MacGregor, JV, 209 F.3d 252, 254, 259-61
(3d Cir. 2000) (interpreting In re Leckie as standing for the textual proposition, and
holding that affirmative defenses of recoupment and setoff were not interests and were
therefore not extinguished by sale).
189.
See Buxbaum & Curcio, supra note 182, at 405-09 (making a similar argument).
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its customer list, others have interests in it (whether or not they
are property interests) which prevent its sale under section
363(f). Toysmart's bundle of rights in the property simply does
not include the right to sell the list, because it or its trustee
cannot sell property in which both Toysmart and another have an
interest unless the sale is authorized by section 363(f). Section
541(c) puts the list in the estate, but it cannot cancel the
customer's rights by saying that Toysmart's promise not to sell
the list is merely a contractual restriction that the trustee may
ignore. Rather, the customer has an interest, analogous to a
covenant running with the land, and the trustee must comply
with section 363(f) before selling the list free of the customer's
interest.
The problem with this argument, of course, is that a
customer has no interest in her name and other information that
is remotely akin to a covenant running with the land.19 In the
cases commentators most often cite as supporting an expanded
vision of "interest" in section 363(f), there has been a relationship
between the covenant and the property to which it related.19 It is
this relationship that apparently turns a contractual restriction
that the trustee may ignore under section 541(c) into an interest
that the trustee must respect under section 363. Generally, a
covenant runs with the land if: "(1) the parties intend it to run
with the land; (2) it 'touches and concerns' the land; and, (3)
there is privity of estate between the owner of the burdened
property and the person who seeks to enforce the covenant." 92 If
190.
Buxbaum and Curcio make this basic error in their statement: "Like the cases
mentioned above, the sale of Personal Information by debtors should be governed by
section 363(f) since the owners of the Personal Information (the customers) have an
'interest in such property' within the meaning of that section." Id. at 409. First, the "cases
mentioned above" in their article do not support the view. Those cases relate to promises
running with existing property. Second, the customers do not "own" their personal
information. It is true that at the end of the sentence Buxbaum and Curcio use the clause
"within the meaning of that section." Id. But the meaning of the section is what they and
we are seeking. It begs the question to say the customers have an interest within the
meaning of the section when trying to explain the section.
191. In re Dundee, 1992 WL 53743, at *3 (declaring that a debtor's obligations to
make repairs "touch and concern' the land"); In re Leckie, 99 F.3d at 582 ("[W]e hold that
the Fund's and Plan's rights to collect premium payments from Appellees constitute
interests in the assets that Appellees now wish to sell, or have sold already. Those rights
are grounded, at least in part, in the fact that those very assets have been employed for
coal-mining purposes .... ."). In Toysmart, the "rights" of the customers are grounded in a
name, something no one owns. See also Folger Adam Sec., 209 F.3d at 254, 260-61
(finding that the affirmative defenses of setoff, recoupment, and other contract defenses,
did not constitute an "interest" for purposes of section 363(f) and therefore were not
extinguished by a sale under this provision).
192. In re Dundee, 1992 WL 53743, at *2. The court decided the Dundee case under
New York law. Most jurisdictions, however, adopt similar tests that define when a
covenant runs with the land. See 9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 60.04[2], at 60-39

816

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[38:777

a covenant (promise) meets these three requirements, it binds
successors and is thus viewed as an interest in land.193
In Toysmart, the promise not to sell the customer's name is
not connected to the customer list, nor does the promise touch
and concern the customer list. At the time Toysmart made the
promise, it related to the particular customer's information
alone,"' an item in which no one had a property interest.' Thus,
there is no promise touching and concerning the property in
question-the customer list. The promise, if it runs with
anything, runs with non-property-the customer's information. It
cannot touch and concern the list because it does not relate to the
list.
An interest, however the law defines it, does not simply arise
out of thin air or even a contract. As one appellate court said: "we
find that the District Court... applied an unduly broad
interpretation of the statute when it stated that one has an
interest in a debtor's property simply when one has a right to
demand money from the debtor."'96 In the Toysmart case, it is
doubtful that anyone thought of the Toysmart privacy policy as
anything more than a promise not to reveal information. To turn
this into a quasi property right, or to define "interest" to amount
to no more than a personal obligation, is to put too great a strain
on both the language and history of the Code.
Thus, the customer likely has no interest in the property
(the customer list). Even if she does, the trustee can always sell
whatever interest the debtor has under the ancient common law
rule favoring the alienability of property."' 7 Of course, a
purchaser would pay less for property encumbered by another's
interest than property sold "free and clear" of that interest.
Section 363(f), by permitting the trustee, under certain
circumstances, to sell the property "free and clear" of another's
interest, maximizes the amount received on sale and thus the
value of the estate. In a case like Toysmart's, the trustee would
certainly prefer to conduct a sale under section 363(f) rather than

(Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2001).
"The principal issue is whether either or
193. In re Dundee, 1992 WL 53743, at '::2.
both of the stipulations create an interest in the Property that would be enforceable under
New York law against a subsequent purchaser." See also 9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY,
supra note 192, § 60.04[1]-[2], at 60-37 to 60-40.
194. Refer to note 72 supra and accompanying text (quoting Toysmart's promise).
195. Refer to Part 1.A.2 supra (indicating that while an aggregate customer list
likely constitutes "property," a particular customer's information likely does not).
196. In re Leckie, 99 F.3d at 581.
197. See 1 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 192, § 13.01[3], at 13-7 to 13-8.
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have to offer the list to buyers subject to the rights of individual
customers. Regardless, the trustee can sell the list.
Moreover, the other provisions of section 363 offer the
customer claiming an "interest" in the list scant comfort. Section
363(e) says that if the non-debtor party has an interest in
property of the estate, the court shall provide "adequate
protection" of that interest.'98 Typically, this provision safeguards
a secured party's interest in collateral that is declining in value
following the filing of the bankruptcy petition.'99 The secured
party requires protection because the stay precludes it from
foreclosing on its interest."' 0 Normally, adequate protection in
such a case would require the debtor to provide a cash payment
and/or a lien on another property. 201
How does privacy fit into this scheme intended to protect
monetary interests? Unfortunately for customers, bankruptcy
law is unused to addressing the question of how to provide
adequate protection of privacy interests. There is no provision in
the Code to protect privacy. The closest is one intended to protect
the public from scandalous matter and the debtor from loss of
trade secrets. 20 2 Neither of these provisions would provide the

protection the customer seeks. In the absence of a more explicit
privacy regime, a court may find that whatever interest, if any, a
customer possesses in its information is simply incapable of
adequate protection under section 363(e).
Two commentators argue that Toysmart's customers have a
privacy interest in their information that is protected by the U.S.
Constitution.0 ' They contend that the contract with Toysmart
created a subjective expectation of privacy that was also
198.
Section 363(e) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any time, on request of
an entity that has an interest in property used, sold, or leased,... by the
trustee, the court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or condition such
use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such
interest....
11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1994).
199.
See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 56 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5842
(stating that § 363(e) provides that an entity having an interest in a property proposed for
sale "may bid at the sale.., and set off against the purchase price up to the amount of the
entity's claim. No prior valuation.., would limit this bidding right, since the bid at the
sale would be determinative of value."). See also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 174-75 (1978),
reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6135-36.
200.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (providing that an automatic stay goes into effect upon filing
of a bankruptcy petition).
201. Id. § 361. See also 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 157, 363.05[2], at
363-39 (noting that "the requirement of adequate protection in § 363(e) is mandatory").
202.
11 U.S.C. § 107(b).
203.
See Buxbaum & Curcio, supranote 182, at 409-12.
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objectively reasonable, and protected under the Constitution."' A
Bankruptcy Court, as a federal actor, thus cannot authorize a
sale of such information unless there is a sufficient governmental
interest that outweighs the customer's privacy interest.0 '
This argument is most persuasive when applied to
information that is highly personal. Some of the information that
Toysmart gathered may fall into this category. For example,
social security number and information about one's child's toy
preferences might be considered personal. Other publicly
available information like name and address is less personal,
making it less likely that a plaintiff could successfully argue that
it has a privacy interest that outweighs the countervailing
consideration of maximizing the estate available to creditors.
Other information, like credit card data and observable shopping
patterns, probably falls somewhere in between on the spectrum
from public to highly personal.
The bankruptcy courts rarely engage in an equitable
balancing test, as Part III.B below demonstrates. It seems rather
unlikely that they would do so in the case of an asserted
constitutional privacy interest. As the cases will reveal, they
have done so in areas in which a broad social consensus existed
regarding the importance of the particular interest. Privacy
concerns lack such a consensus. The constitutional argument is
nonetheless an interesting one, and perhaps more likely to
succeed than an argument under section 363(f). Regardless, its
basic insight-that customers have a reasonable expectation that
a site will not sell their information-is important to the analysis
and plays a role in the approach suggested in Part IV below.
c. Inferring CurrentLaw from the Provisions of the Senate's
Bankruptcy Bill. The Senate version of the proposed bankruptcy
amendments provides support for the argument that current law
would include customer lists in the estate and permit their sale,
regardless of a pre-bankruptcy promise to the contrary.0 6 Under the
Senate's bill, companies that have promised not to reveal customer
information may not do so unless the judge allows the sale to go

204. See id. at 411-12.
205.
See id. at 412.
206.
See 147 CONG. REC. S2494 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2001) (adopting S. 420 § 231); see
also Statements on IntroducedBills and Joint Resolutions, 146 CONG. REC. S6575 (2000)
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (introducing The Privacy Policy Enforcement in Bankruptcy
Act, and stating, "[tihis legislation is needed because the customer databases of failed
Internet firms now can be sold during bankruptcy, even in violation of the firm's stated
privacy policy. That is wrong.").
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forward. 7 One might infer from this provision that the Senate
believes that bankrupt companies may sell such information under
current law notwithstanding a promise to the contrary.
Interestingly, the Senate bill does not place its amendment
in the executory contract section (section 365). Rather, it amends
section 363 on the sale of property in bankruptcy. 2°8 Thus, the
Senate is not treating a promise not to sell the customer's
information as a contract to be assumed or rejected, but rather is
treating the aggregate list as property of the estate subject to
sale.
Because the Bankruptcy Code does not usually define
"property," a court might construe the new provision to mean
that if other law concludes that customer lists are property then
they are protected as stated by the amendment. This seems
unlikely, however. If the Senate had any doubts, why did it put
customer lists in 363, a section that assumes the existence of
property? By creating this new provision, the Senate is most
likely confirming what business long ago decided-customer lists
are property. They are not some intangible, nonsaleable, personal
right.
B. Other Considerationsin Bankruptcy
1. When Equity Trumps Law-Of Bank Payments, Secured
Claims, and the Abandonment of Hazardous Property. The cases
almost always speak of bankruptcy as being a contest between
creditors and a debtor." 9 This is not surprising. The purpose of the
bankruptcy clause in the U.S. Constitution, which is reflected in the
Bankruptcy Code itself is to assure relief to debtors and creditors in
a time of financial crisis, and also to serve the "[n]ational interest in
general." 210 To further this end, the trustee may break contracts and
assemble and sell the debtor's property.
In a few areas, the courts, in fulfilling this purpose, have
incorporated considerations of the public interest into their
analyses. Indeed, in some cases, the courts seem to have
disregarded the literal wording of the statute to arrive at an
equitable result. A brief review of some of these cases reveals

207.
See 147 CONG. REc. S2494 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2001) (adopting S. 420 § 231).
208.
See id.
209.
See, e.g., Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 199 (1988)
(deciding that debtors may not retain equity interest in farm in opposition to the
creditors' senior unsecured claims).
210.
See Foreword to BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (Da Capo Press 1972)
(1935).
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that the mark of equity is stamped on the entire Code. The
Supreme Court has affirmed that the bankruptcy courts sit as
courts of equity.2 11 This equitable foundation opens the door to
arguments that privacy as a right should be separately
considered and protected without regard to paying or not paying
any particular creditor's claim. Thus, there may be room for a
court to prohibit the sale of customer information collected under
a promise not to disclose it, despite the lack of clear statutory
authorization for such a ban. Despite the judge's comments in the
Toysmart case, however, a court's taking such a step that
withstands scrutiny on appeal is unlikely.2 12
a. Bank of Marin v. England. 2 3 The Bank of Marin v.
England case provides an example of the Supreme Court's
occasional movement away from a strict interpretation of statutory
language toward incorporating equitable considerations. In that
case, the bankrupt maintained a checking account with the Bank of
Marin. 2 5 According to the law in effect at the time (1966), no person
holding property of the debtor could dispose of it after bankruptcy
occurred.216 Without notice of the bankruptcy proceeding of its
customer, the bank paid a number of the bankrupt's checks drawn
on the account.2 The bankruptcy statute provided no safe harbor to
protect a bank that had made payments from the debtor's account,
even without notice of the bankruptcy proceeding.2 8
A majority of the Supreme Court nevertheless protected the
Bank of Marin from having to pay the proceeds of the checks over
to the bankruptcy trustee.219 Justice Douglas, speaking for the
Court, stated the famous lines: "[W]e do not read these statutory
provisions with the ease of a computer. There is an overriding

211.
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984).
212. Refer to Part fl.A.3 supra (describing the proposed settlement between the FTC
and Toysmart and the judge's objections to it).
213. 385 U.S. 99 (1966).
214. For another example of the court's departure from the Bankruptcy Code's
statutory language, see Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992). Sections 506 (a) and (d)
appear to reduce a secured claim to the value of the collateral. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), (d)
(1994). For example, if a secured creditor's claim is for $1 million and the appraised value
of the collateral is only $750,000, section 506 seems to require the lien to be voided for any
amount above $750,000. Pre-Code bankruptcy law said the lien stayed on the property.
Timm, 502 U.S. at 416-19 (holding that liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected). It was
this rule that the Court would not change in Timm. Id. at 417-20. As in Bank of Marin,
there was a vigorous dissent. Id. at 420-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
215. Bank of Marin,385 U.S. at 100-01.
216. Id. at 102.
217. Id. at 100.
218. Id. at 102-04, 107-08.
219.
Id. at 103.
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consideration that equitable principles govern the exercise of
bankruptcy jurisdiction."2 20 Justice Douglas ignored the statutory
language on the grounds that Congress, in writing a statute to
implement a constitutional provision that had its roots in English
equity, could not have intended an inequitable result.22 1
A dissenter pointed out that equity can only be used to
interpret, not to overturn, a statute, and that the majority's
decision effectively rewrote the statute and ignored Congress'
mandate. 2 In recent years, the pendulum has swung in favor of
the dissenter's view. Some twenty years after the Bank of Marin
case, the Court said: ".... whatever equitable powers remain in
the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the
confines of the Bankruptcy Code."2 Nevertheless, the Court has,
on certain occasions, taken positions that seem at least doubtful
based on the language of the Bankruptcy Code.
b. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco.224 In a famous labor relations
case, NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, the Court again ignored the strict
language of the Code. That language, as applied to contracts
generally, allowed the trustee to reject an executory contract subject
only to a business judgment standard." The Court held that, before
an employer could reject a labor relations contract in a Chapter 11
proceeding, the bankruptcy court had to weigh the equities between
the parties. 2 6 The judges, finding no support for this ruling in the
clear language of the Bankruptcy Code, turned instead to equity,
pre-Code rulings, and decisions of other courts.22 7 More dramatically
perhaps, the Court, in the first footnote in the case, stated that the
intention of the Bankruptcy Code was, inter alia,to "provide greater
2 28
protection to the debtor, creditors and the public interest."

220. Id.
Id.
221.
222. See id. at 109-10 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ablers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988).
223.
224. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
225.
Id. at 523.
See id. at 526-27.
226.
227.
Id. at 523-24 ("Although there is no indication in § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code
that rejection of collective-bargaining agreements should be governed by a standard
different from that governing other executory contracts, all of the Courts of Appeals which
have considered the matter have concluded that the standard should be a stricter one. We
agree with these Courts of Appeals that because of the special nature of a collectivebargaining contract, and the consequent 'law of the shop' which it creates, a somewhat
stricter standard should govern the decision of the Bankruptcy Court to allow rejection of
a collective-bargaining agreement.") (citations omitted).
228.
Id. at 517 n.1 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 5 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787) (emphasis added).
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c. Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection.229 In 1986, in one of its most controversial
cases, the Court went directly against the words of the Code and,
relying on the thinnest of reeds (three minor pre-Code cases), held
that a debtor's trustee could not abandon hazardous material." ° The
Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection case is dramatic both because its result
seems not only fair, but necessary to the public health, and because
the language of the Code seemingly provided no alternative
interpretation to allowing the debtor an unfettered right to abandon
unproductive, valueless property.
Under the Code, the trustee, to avoid burdening the estate,
may abandon property that has no value to the debtor.231 For
example, assume that the debtor owns Blackacre. Debtor is in a
liquidation proceeding. Blackacre has a value, not counting
mortgages, of $1 million. The debtor, however, gave three
mortgages on Blackacre pre-bankruptcy to secure a total of $1.5
million in debt. Because the trustee may not normally set aside a
properly perfected (recorded) mortgage,232 the property has no
value to the estate. The trustee will simply abandon it to one of
the mortgage holders (probably the first).
Property may also be valueless because it lacks a resale
market. The drafters of the Code may have also had this
circumstance in mind in providing the trustee with an
abandonment power. 3 What they apparently did not consider
directly was property with a negative value-polluted,
contaminated, toxic property that would cost more to clean up
than it was worth on the market when sanitized.
The Court appeared to conclude that it was unfair for a
debtor to poison land and then walk away from it. 234 It also
apparently took a dim view of the alternative of using the public
purse to clean up dangerously polluted land if the debtor were
allowed to abandon it.235 In contrast, the dissent vigorously
229.
474 U.S. 494 (1986).
230.
Id. at 500-01, 507.
231.
11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1994).
232.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the deprivation of
"life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
233.
11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (indicating that property "of inconsequential value and
benefit" may be abandoned).
234.
See Midlantic,474 U.S. at 502-07. The Court used Congress' emphasis, in both
other statutes and Bankruptcy Code legislative history, on public health and safety and
environmental protection to point to a general concern for the public welfare. See id. This
alleged concern is as absent from the Code's abandonment provision as was a safe harbor
for banks in Bank ofMarin.
235.
Id. at 498-99 nn.2-3 and accompanying text.
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objected to the Court's reading into the law a duty not to abandon
hazardous property. 236 The creditors, of course, likely also
objected. 237 The debtor would ultimately be liable for the cleanup
paid for with assets otherwise destined for them.238
That the Court has sometimes ignored the letter of the law
for what it believes is its spirit is indisputable. It has also shown
a willingness to consider nonbankruptcy law's policies in
administering the estate. How might the Court react to a debtor's
desire to sell and the creditors' plea not to dissipate assets by
preventing the sale of the debtor's most valuable asset-its
customer list and other information? Based on the Court's
history, it is not likely to be bound by a strict reading of the Code
if a majority feels that such a reading will lead to an unfair
result. In the Toysmart case, there is the additional element of a
promise never to sell the information,239 making a stronger
equitable argument on behalf of the customer that the trustee
should not be able to sell the information. Although alleged to be
conservative, this Supreme Court may balance the equities and
conclude that an unfettered sale of personal data is unfair and
not required by the Code.240 Indeed, the lower court in Toysmart
was ostensibly willing to take such a step.241
In balancing the equities, a court would determine whether
the harm the consumer would suffer from disclosure of her
information greatly outweighs the right of the creditors to have
the maximum value realized from the debtor's estate. Such
considerations as, for example, to whom the list was being sold
would be relevant. If the debtor sought to sell a list of purchasers
of educational toys to, for example, a pornographic site, the
equities may weigh in favor of the customer.
However, it is important to keep in mind that the great
exceptions in the Bildisco and Midlantic cases implicated
something more than merely a broken promise. Debtors break
promises all the time. Filing for bankruptcy itself breaks a
promise to pay a debt because the debtor's whole purpose in filing

236.
Id. at 507-08 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
237.
Id. at 516-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that "barring abandonment
and forcing a cleanup would effectively place respondents' interest in protecting the public
first ahead of the claims of [the] other creditors").
238.
Id.
239.
Refer to note 72 supra and accompanying text (quoting Toysmars promise).
240. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., The War Over the Court, NEWSWEEK, July 10, 2000, at 18
("[T]he [C]ourt clearly (has] demonstrated that it is hardly the cadre of rigid conservatives
some in the press make it out to be.").
241.
See Judge Disputes FTC Settlement, supra note 82.
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is to discharge the debt in the bankruptcy proceeding.242 In
Bildisco, the question of labor peace was at issue.243 Allowing the
rejection of collective bargaining contracts as easily as ordinary
business contracts might bring a recurrence of the near labor
crises of the 1930s, when Congress passed the first laws allowing
unionization-or so the opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part reasoned.244 In Midlantic, a final footnote to the majority
opinion said: "The abandonment power is not to be fettered by
laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the
public health or safety from imminent and identifiable harm."24
The italicized
clause has become the standard for all later
246
cases.

Is selling someone's personal information an imminent and
identifiable harm? It seems unlikely. Without Congressional
action, it is doubtful that bankruptcy courts will ultimately use
their equitable powers to develop a rule under which the trustee
may not sell customer lists whether or not the bankrupt
promised to maintain privacy. In the end, the question will boil
down to a simple choice: Which is more important-creditors'
rights to a maximum benefit, or consumers' hurt feelings over a
broken promise? If history is any guide, the consumer will have
to learn to live with the hurt.4 7 Courts usually
act to protect the
2 48
debtor's estate, not the non-debtor party.
This is not to say, however, that the trustee should always
be able to sell the list. A bankruptcy court may appropriately
242.
Cf. Loomis, supra note 56 (quoting a practicing attorney as stating that if the
promise not to disclose the contents of a customer list were to survive in bankruptcy, "it
would be practically the only promise that does").
243.
NLRB v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 526 (1984).
244.
Id. at 547-53. The four justices concurring and dissenting would have gone
further than the majority and forbidden any rejection of a collective bargaining agreement
by the employer without first following the requirements of the National Labor Relations
Act. Id. at 535-54. Congress ultimately responded with an amendment to the Bankruptcy
Code that embodied the dissent's recommendations. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1994).
245.
Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 507 n.9 (1986)
(emphasis added).
246.
See, e.g., In re St. Lawrence Corp., 248 B.R. 734, 738-40 (Bankr. D. N.J. 2000);
In re Rancourt, 144 B.R. 601, 601 n.1 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1992).
247.
In one recent case, Aiello v. ProvidianFinancialCorp., the Seventh Circuit held
that a debtor had no action under section 362(h) of the Code against a creditor for
harassment. 239 F.3d 876, 880-81 (7th Cir. 2001). This was so even though the creditor
threatened to charge the debtor with fraud if she would not reaffirm a debt. Id. at 878.
Acknowledging that the debtor might have an action in tort at state law against the
creditor for emotional distress, the court held that the automatic stay, which the creditor
was violating by harassing the debtor, was financial in character. Id. at 879-80. It was
not intended to protect peace of mind. Id. at 879.
248.
See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 157, 105.02[2], at 105-13 to 10514; see also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 157, 541.02, at 541-8 to 54-9.
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consider how best to maximize the estate. 249 A sale of the
customer list, particularly over a promise to the contrary, will
likely devalue the goodwill and trademarks of the bankrupt. A
court might appropriately find that the maximum value for
creditors will be realized if the goodwill and trademarks are sold,
and the list destroyed." ° In many cases, however, these values
will be speculative, and the list may be worth more than the
goodwill of an unpopular e-tailer. Nevertheless, the point
remains that the bankruptcy judge may consider such factors
appropriate to the case that are less speculative than trying to
value, for example, the harm to e-commerce generally if
bankruptcy law does not respect the promises contained in
privacy policies.
2. Remedies (Injunctive Relief/Specific Performance) and
RegulatoryActions
a. Injunctive Relief Granted to the Non-Debtor on the NonDebtor'sPetition. The earlier analysis argued that a court is unlikely
to provide adequate protection of the customer's alleged property
interest." Equally, that the customer will be unable to prove money
damages is unlikely to persuade a court to provide her with
injunctive relief. A "claim" in bankruptcy is a right to payment of
money.22 Bankruptcy law considers all rights capable of being
satisfied by a monetary award, even if the holder of the right could
have sought equitable relief at state law as an alternative. 3 The
Code requires courts to estimate the value of a claim in dollar terms
and then to discharge all claims, no matter how contingent,

249. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 5 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5791
(stating that the Bankruptcy Act's policy is "to include all of the property of the debtor in
the bankruptcy case and to allow the trustee more easily to recover property that may
have been transferred by the debtor. As a result.. .[,] the amounts that will be returned to
all creditors can be greater.").
250.
Such considerations may account for the result in the eToys bankruptcy. EToys,
like Toysmart, had promised its customers that it would not sell their information. Don
Oldenburg, A Question of Privacy, WASH. POST, June 6, 2001, at C12. Several states'
attorneys general objected when eToys sought to sell the information in bankruptcy. Id.
Eventually, eToys sold the rights to its name and Web site to KB Toys for $3.35 million.
Martin Stone, KB Toys Acquires Etoys Domain, NESsBYTES, May 18, 2001, available at
2001 WL 2818847. Anyone now visiting the eToys site is transferred to the KB site. Id.
Etoys did not provide customer information to KB. See Oldenburg, supra.Instead, it is to
contact its customers and advise them on how to transfer their information to KB if they
so desire. See Stone, supra.
251.
Refer to notes 198-202 supra and accompanying text (arguing that § 363(e)
offers the customer "scant comfort").
252. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1994).
253.
2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 157, 101.05[5], at 101-36.
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unmatured, or unliquidated. Whether a plaintiff would be unable
to establish money damages is irrelevant. 2 ' The real question is
whether the right the plaintiff enjoys at either state or federal
nonbankruptcy law is one for which the law would allow satisfaction
in money rather than resolution through equity. If a money
satisfaction would be the normal legal right of the plaintiff, then
that person has a claim. 6
Only if the plaintiff would have no option under
nonbankruptcy law to sue for damages, but had only a remedy
for specific performance or injunction, would the plaintiffs right
not be a claim, not be subject to estimation, and not be
discharged. 7 Because the person with a right to privacy claim is
likely, if she has any cause of action at all, to have a right to
money damages with equitable relief only as an alternative
remedy, she would have no right to an injunction or specific
performance. As the contractual analysis revealed earlier, if the
privacy policy is a contract, the customer might convince a court
to award specific performance for breach of the non-disclosure
provision." However, a court might provide this remedy as an
alternative to monetary damages-not because the customer
could not sue for such damages under the law. Thus, under
bankruptcy law, any right the customer had that provided her
with a claim would be estimable, and would be estimated by the
court and discharged.25 9 That the claim might be worth zero
would not affect its status as a claim. The court would simply
estimate its value at zero.260

254.
11 U.S.C. § 101(5).
255.
Id. §§ 101(5), 502 (c).
256. See id. § 101(5).
257. The legislative history states that including in the definition of claim the "right
to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to
payment... is intended to cause the liquidation or estimation of contingent rights of
payment for which there may be an alternative equitable remedy .... For example, in
some States, a judgment for specific performance may be satisfied by an alternative right
to payment, in the event performance is refused; in that event, the creditor entitled to
specific performance would have a 'claim' for purposes of a proceeding under title 11 [of
the Bankruptcy Code]." MARY DAvIEs SCOTT & LAWRENCE P. KING, COLLIER PAMPHLET
EDITION BANKRUPTcY CODE § 101, at 20 (2001) (citing 124 CONG. REC. H 11090 (Sept. 28,
1978); S 17406 (Oct. 6, 1978)).
258.
Refer to Part II.B supra.
259.
11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5), 502 (c).
260.
See, e.g., Bittner v. Borne Chem. Co., 691 F.2d 134, 134-37 (3d Cir. 1982).
Although in Bittner the bankruptcy court estimated the claim at zero only for the purpose
of temporary disallowance until a state court could determine the amount, the language of
the Court of Appeals recognized such an estimation as fully binding had the bankruptcy
court made it so. Id. at 135-37 ("[Sluch a valuation method is not inconsistent with the
principles which imbue Chapter 11.").
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Thus, the first reason that the customer is unlikely to have
any equitable relief is that the customer has a claim. If she has a
claim, she has a right to share in the estate with other creditors.
If the customer's right is purely equitable, then she has no claim
and thus no right to share in the estate. However, bankruptcy
law will stay exercise of her equitable right if she could have
obtained an injunction in state or federal court prior to the
bankruptcy filing.261 Even if the customer could not have obtained
an injunction pre-bankruptcy because no effort had been made to
sell the list, or because she could not prove the irreparable harm
required to obtain an injunction, 62 the Code could nevertheless
stay her action as an "act... to exercise control over property of
the estate."263
A second reason for a court to deny equitable relief is that to
allow an injunction against selling the customer list would
significantly reduce the value of the debtor's estate. The whole
purpose of bankruptcy is for the trustee to assemble26 4 as large an
estate as possible and either sell it265 or use it266 to maximize
repayment of unsecured claims. For the debtor, the purpose is to
discharge as many rights held by creditors against the debtor as
possible. To allow someone with a contractual claim or right to
privacy to obtain an injunction against the debtor would be to
deny the debtor the right to sell a valuable asset whose proceeds
would either be distributed to creditors or used to help
rehabilitate the debtor. The likelihood of a court doing this is
very small.
A third reason for a court to deny equitable relief is that the
sale of a customer list would be an act "not in the ordinary course
of business."26 7 Use of the list would occur in the ordinary course.
261.
Bankruptcy Code section 362 stays such actions. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a)(1) (stating
that the filing of a bankruptcy petition acts as a stay of an "action or proceeding against
the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case
under this title").
262.
Refer to Part II.B supra (discussing requirements for an injunction).
263.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).
264.
Id. §§ 704, 541(a)(3), 544-550 (setting forth the trustee's duties).
265.
Id. §§ 701-728.
266.
Id. §§ 1101-1174. See also the following sections in which the Code employs the
same principle of using rather than selling assets: §§ 901-946. (municipal
reorganizations); §§ 1201-1231 (plans for family farmers); §§ 1301-1330 (plans for
individuals with regular income).
267. The phrase "ordinary course of business" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code,
nor for that matter in the Uniform Commercial Code, where it also appears. The story is
told that three-quarters of a century ago, when Karl Llewellyn, the great commercial
lawyer, was asked at a conference what the phrase meant he simply replied: "Everyone
knows what it means." Whether the story is true or apocryphal is irrelevant. The attitude
persists in American statutory enactments. No one bothers to define it.
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Selling it would not, because the trustee would find it hard to
conduct business without a customer list,26 and terminating one's

business is not an act in the ordinary course of business. Under
the Bankruptcy Code, notice and a hearing are required before a
sale of property not in the ordinary course.26 Under the Code, the
court need hold a hearing only if a party in interest demands one
after receiving notice.27 ° Implicit in the word "hearing" is the
right and duty of the judge to determine whether the sale not in
the ordinary course of business should take place. If the
customer's right to privacy is a contract right against the
debtor,271 or if the customer has a property interest in the

customer list,2 72 then the customer is a party in interest.2 73 Even if

the customer is not a party in interest, the court in its discretion
can allow the customer to participate and object.274
The Code makes clear the distinction between "in the
ordinary course of business" and "not in the ordinary course of
business."275 The trustee may conduct a sale in the ordinary
course "unless the court orders otherwise."27 A sale not in the
ordinary course, in contrast, can occur only with the court's
permission.2 Thus, an injunction precluding sale is unnecessary.
The Code does not authorize the trustee to make a sale not in the
ordinary course without giving everyone the right to demand a
hearing.278 If the court does not permit the sale, it cannot be
undertaken.27 The real question is whether a court would be
persuaded to stop the sale under its equitable powers. The
previous analysis suggested not, at least under conventional law.
268. Of course, the trustee could grant nonexclusive licenses to the list rather than
selling it outright. Such licenses would permit the trustee to use the list in operating the
debtor's business. See JAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 8.01,

at 8-2 to 8-3 (2001) (explaining that a "nonexclusive license gives the licensee no right to
control or curtail competition within the scope of the license, only the right to use the
licensed subject matter without fear of suit by the licensor"). However, in cases where the
debtor had promised not to sell the information, such licenses would not be in the
ordinary course.
269. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b).
270. Id. If no one demands a hearing, presumably no one is interested enough to
object, and the court is not required to conduct a hearing.
271. Refer to Part I.B supra.
272. Refer to notes 179-205 supra and accompanying text.
273. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d), 1109(b), 1112(b), 1144 (outlining the various rights afforded
to a party in interest).
274. Id. § 105(a) (allowing the court, "sua sponte," to take any action necessary to
carry out the provisions of Title 11 or to prevent any abuse of process).
275. Id. § 363(b)-(c).
276. Id. § 363(c).
277. Id. § 363(b)(1).
278. Id. (allowing the trustee to sell property only after "notice and a hearing").
279. Id.
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A fourth reason why a court is unlikely to issue an
injunction is, quite simply, that section 105, which gives the
Bankruptcy Court broad power to enforce and implement the
Bankruptcy Code's provisions and purposes, has as its history an
unbroken series of cases in which courts used that power to
protect rather than to dissipate the estate.280 Courts generally do
not use that power to protect non-debtor parties from acts by the
debtor.21' Again, if a court believed that an injunction were
necessary to protect the consumer, it could grant one under its
inherent equitable powers.2 82 Such a step, however, is highly
unlikely.
b. Actions Brought by a Federal or State Regulatory Agency.
Bankruptcy Code section 362(b)(4) will not stay an action (except to
enforce a monetary judgment) brought by a federal or state
regulatory agency in the exercise of its "police or regulatory
powers."2 3 For example, if the FTC brought an action against a
debtor on the grounds that the debtor's activity or proposed activity
were deceptive or unfair, the Code would not stay such an action.
However, if the action were to result in an order whose enforcement
would effectively deplete the estate, the court may stay enforcement
of that order.

280. In theory, the equitable jurisdiction in section 105, which supplements that in
section 362, is available for the benefit of both the debtor and non-debtor parties.
However, courts employ it almost exclusively on behalf of the debtor. Two examples
suffice for illustrative purposes. First, courts sometimes grant injunctions against nondebtors' lawsuits against officers of a debtor corporation because allowing such lawsuits
would distract the officers from their duties. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 157,
% 105.03[2][a], at 105-37 to 105-42. Second, courts may enjoin non-debtor parties from
bringing lawsuits against the debtor's insurers because insurance proceeds, even though
payable directly to creditors of a debtor under some state statutes, are in reality assets of
the debtor's estate. Id. %105.03[1][b], at 105-30 & n.28 to 105-31. The person with rights
amounting to a claim is expected to share with other creditors in accordance with
Bankruptcy Code requirements. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(b). The person with rights not
amounting to a claim is barred from interfering with the estate or the debtor even if she
never receives anything to compensate her for her lost rights. Id. (stating that all
creditors' claims of the same class are paid pro rata from the estate).
281.
Refer to note 247 supra and accompanying text.
282.
11 U.S.C. § 105 (a) ("The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of Title 11.").
283.
Id. § 362(b)(4). An amendment to this subsection in 1998 would appear to
restrict its wording. See Act of Oct. 21, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-866
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)) (amending the 1994 version). COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY notes, however, that commentators have uniformly proclaimed this not to be
the Congressional purpose, and courts have followed the commentators' lead. 3 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 157, 362.05[5] [b], at 362-61 & n. 64b; SCOTT & KING, supra
note 257, at 264.
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In Board of Governors v. MCorp Financial, Inc.,2 s the
Supreme Court held that a lower court could not second guess
the scope of a regulatory agency's powers.2 85 The Court, however,
went on to imply that if enforcement of a regulatory body's order
could affect the bankruptcy court's control over the debtor's
estate, then a stay of that order might be proper.2 6 As the Collier
treatise points out, this means, perhaps counter-intuitively, that
the regulatory body could287 pursue its action but might be
prevented from enforcing it.
An example may illustrate this point. What is the basic
difference among the following: (i) the state cleaning a polluted
lake and suing the debtor for reimbursement; (ii) the state
ordering the debtor to clean the lake; and (iii) the state ordering
the debtor to stop polluting the lake? In the first case, the state is
most likely an unsecured creditor with a claim against the estate.
As such, it is likely to receive only a percentage of its total claim.
In the second case, by making the debtor do the work, the state is
essentially paying for its cleanup out of the debtor's estate to the
detriment of other creditors. 288 A court is unlikely to allow the
state to enhance its position vis a vis other creditors in this way.
Thus, a court would likely stay the order to perform the
cleanup. 8 9 In the last case, an injunction ordering the debtor not

284.
502 U.S. 32 (1991).
285.
Id. at 40 ("MCorp contends that in order for § 362(b)(4) to obtain, a court must
first determine whether the proposed exercise of police or regulatory power is legitimate
and that, therefore, in this litigation the lower courts did have the authority to examine
the legitimacy of the Board's actions and to enjoin those actions. We disagree."). See also 3
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 157, 1 362.05 [5] [b], at 362-62 to 362-63.
286.
MCorp, 502 U.S. at 41.
It is possible, of course, that the Board proceedings, like many other enforcement
actions, may conclude with the entry of an order that will affect the Bankruptcy
Court's control over the property of the estate, but that possibility cannot be
sufficient to justify the operation of the stay against an enforcement proceeding
that is expressly exempted by § 362(b)(4). To adopt such a characterization of
enforcement proceedings would be to render subsection (b)(4)'s exception almost
meaningless. If and when the Board's proceedings culminate in a final order,
and if and when judicial proceedings are commenced to enforce such an order,
then it may well be proper for the Bankruptcy Court to exercise its concurrent
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). We are not persuaded, however, that the
automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code have any application to
ongoing, nonfinal administrative proceedings.
Id. (emphasis in original).
287.
3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 157, %1
362.05[5] [b], at 362-62 to 362-63.
288.
One court that noted the dollar impact of specific performance was In re
Kilpatrick, where the court said, "if, as a practical matter, compliance with an injunction
requires expenditure of money on the debtor's part, then the nondebtor holds a claim." In
re Kilpatrick, 160 B.R. 560, 568 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993).
289.
It might do so under its equitable powers of section 105. In the alternative, the
court might simply declare, 'without using section 105, that the regulatory body, in trying
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to dump toxic waste into a lake should be immediately
enforceable because, presumably, the debtor's refraining from
dumping toxic waste into a lake would not significantly deplete
the estate.29
How does all of this relate to the Toysmart case? First,
according to published reports, the bankruptcy judge acted
consistently with
section 362(b)(4) and did not interfere with the
FTC's action.2 11 When the FTC and Toysmart reached a
settlement agreement setting terms for the sale in July 2000, the
judge expressed reservations about the sale but did not prevent
efforts to hold one. 2 One month later, the judge stated that
objections to the sale could be made when a prospective buyer
appeared. 3 Shortly thereafter, a sale to Toysmart's principal, the
Disney Corp., was reportedly completed for fifty thousand
29 4 As part of the deal, Disney destroyed
dollars.
the customer
295
list.

In legal terms, the FTC action proceeded because it was a
regulatory action and therefore exempt from the automatic stay
under section 362.296 Any proposed sale, being out of the ordinary
course of business, required notice and a hearing under section
363(b)(1).2 7 The FTC had an absolute right to carry its action
forward but could not interfere with estate property. 298 Because
the eventual sale was to the parent buyer under an agreement to
destroy the list, the judge presumably had no difficulty allowing
it. Had a proposed buyer not been to her liking, she could have

to enforce its order, was no longer covered by a section 362(b) exception, but came under
the automatic stay applicable to creditors generally under section 362(a).
290. Of course, in a sense, every order will cost money because every change will
require expenditures to implement a new method of activity. For example, the debtor in
the text has to dump its waste somewhere else if not the lake. The question then is
whether this would significantly impact the estate. If it would, the court would have to
consider what action would be appropriate. It seems unlikely that the court would permit
the debtor to continue dumping in the lake unless it were already so polluted that more
waste would not cause further harm.
291. See generally Judge Disputes FTC Settlement, supra note 82.
292. Id.
293. See Judge:No one wants to play with Toysmart's list, ONET News.com, Aug. 17,
2000; see also Stephanie Stoughton, Judge Declines to Rule on Toysmart Database,Stalls
Sale of Customer Information, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 18, 2000, at C2 [hereinafter Judge
Declines to Rule], availableat 2000 WL 3338772.
294. Davidson, supra note 13.
295. Id.
296. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
297. See id. § 363(b)(1).
298. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUFrCY, supra note 157, 362.05[5] [b], at 362-62 to 36263 (describing the ability of a federal agency to proceed in actions against a debtor under
the police or regulatory power).
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simply refused to allow the sale to go through.299 Had someone,
most likely a creditor, objected that not selling the list meant
wasting estate property in which the creditors had an interest,
the judge could have pointed to her broad equitable powers under
section 105, and held that she would not permit a sale because
the rights of consumers, represented by some forty state
attorneys general, outweighed the rights of creditors to maximize
their dollar return."0 Even without resort to section 105, she
could have held that the sale required her approval, after notice
and a hearing, and that under section 363(b)(1) alone she could
disapprove the sale." 1
The preceding analysis, however, argues that not permitting
the sale to go forward would be inconsistent with bankruptcy
policy. Preventing sale of the list is akin to a state's ordering a
debtor to clean a lake. Ordering a debtor to clean a lake
exemplifies the state's effectively taking property from the estate
that would otherwise go to creditors. Preventing the sale of the
list exemplifies the state's preventing the trustee from
distributing estate property to creditors. In Toysmart, the
difference, of course, is the existence of the promise. But
bankruptcy law makes the promise qua promise meaningless.
Of course, the FTC settlement with Toysmart did not
prohibit the sale of the list. Rather, it placed conditions on that
sale, permitting sale only to a Qualified Buyer in the same line of
business who also purchased Toysmart's goodwill and agreed to
abide by its privacy policy."' The bankruptcy judge could have
found that those conditions actually maximized the size of the
estate. The adverse publicity accompanying the threatened sale
caused the list to decline in value."3 Placing conditions on the
sale that reassured consumers could make the asset more
valuable to potential purchasers than it otherwise would have
been. However, other conditions of the sale, including that it be
as a part of a sale of Toysmart's goodwill, and that the purchaser
must agree to abide by the privacy policy, might have effectively
depleted the estate. Further, the question whether a regulatory
body like the FTC can essentially label conduct that bankruptcy
law would permit a "deceptive" practice was never reached.
299.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
300. Id. § 105 (permitting the judge to take "any action... to enforce or implement
court orders or rules").
301.
See id. § 363(b)(1).
302.
Refer to Part II.B.3 supra.
303.
See Judge Declines to Rule, supranote 293, at C2 (quoting an attorney for one of
Toysmart.com's creditors as saying, "[W]e know there was interest before this hullabaloo.
But [potential purchasers] were frightened off.").
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As it turned out, the matter of how to address a regulatory
settlement placing conditions on the sale of estate property never
came to a test."4 Disney stepped in."5 Interesting legal questions
were destroyed along with the list.
3. Summary. Matters are uncertain, conceptually, in
bankruptcy although the result mandated by the Code seems clear.
Most likely, a bankruptcy court would consider a customer list to be
part of the property of the estate notwithstanding an otherwise
enforceable contractual restriction against sale of individual items of
data. Further, the trustee would reject the non-executory contract to
prevent burdening the estate. A customer might argue that the
trustee may not sell the list free of the customer's interest under
section 363(f). However, section 363 probably does not even apply
because the customer does not have an "interest" in property as
traditionally defined °6 A court might hold that equitable
considerations counsel against permitting a sale. That seems
unlikely unless it is clear that the purchaser would be engaged in a
business that the reasonable person would find offensive. An action
by a regulatory body could proceed over the stay, but the bankruptcy
judge would have to evaluate any settlement or judgment for
consistency with bankruptcy policy. If the result would deplete the
estate, the judge may refuse to enforce it.
IV. STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN COMPETING INTERESTS
Of course, to say that the legal result would likely permit the
sale of customer data in bankruptcy regardless of the presence or
absence of a promise against resale is just the beginning of the
analysis. The more important question is whether this result is
desirable from a broader policy perspective. Both economic and
non-economic policies may support the argument that
bankruptcy law's policy of maximizing the size of the estate
should not trump the expectations of the average consumer. The
following discusses the competing policy interests implicated,
market and legislative responses to the question of when
bankrupt firms should be able to sell customer information, and
makes some proposals for legislative reform that would reconcile

304. See Toysmart Database to Be Destroyed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2001, at C7
(reporting that the decision to destroy Toysmart's customer list effectively concluded the
FTC's suit against Toysmart).
305. Id.
306. Refer to Part M.A.2.b supra (outlining the traditional approach to defining an
"interest").
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the relevant interests and protect both the customer and the etailer.
A. Competing Policy Interests
This Article has repeatedly emphasized that bankruptcy law
seeks to maximize the size of the estate available to pay
unsecured claims.31 7 The most valuable asset of many dot-corns is

their customer information."' Thus, bankruptcy law would
generally permit that asset's sale even over a promise not to
disclose it that would otherwise be enforceable outside of
bankruptcy. While the caselaw reveals that the courts have some
leeway in interpreting the Code to further the public interest, it
also shows that this ability is rarely employed, is used primarily
in cases in which there is a clear legal history demonstrating
wide agreement on the particular issue, and more often protects
the estate than non-debtor parties. The lack of a broad,
longstanding consensus over the appropriate level of privacy
protection is likely to make a court wary of sua sponte
subordinating bankruptcy law to some as yet ill-defined right of
privacy. A more likely result would be a bankruptcy court's
prohibiting or placing conditions on the sale to maximize the
value of the estate; if the sale of the customer list would make it
more difficult for the debtor to sell its other assets like goodwill,
the court can, consistent with bankruptcy policy, take steps to
safeguard the aggregate value of the estate.
Permitting the sale of the list over an otherwise enforceable
promise to the contrary in the name of vindicating bankruptcy
policy may, however, be an inappropriate result when the law
considers broader policy interests. For example, economists may
argue that such a sale is inefficient.
Many, if not most, consumers do not know the contents of
either bankruptcy or privacy law. Many incorrectly assume that
some body of law safeguards their personal information, even
when the site has made no explicit statement describing how it
plans to treat that data.0 9 At least some consumers would see a
promise against disclosure and be induced to deal with the site in

307. Refer to text accompanying notes 48-52, 180 supra (emphasizing the
fundamental underlying bankruptcy policy of maximizing the bankrupt estate).
308. See Davidson, supranote 13 (noting that a dot-corn's customer list is often one of
its most valuable assets-often even more valuable than its physical assets).
309. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1193, 1253 n.255 (1998) (citing the Privacy Rights Clearing House as stating: "Many
consumers are... [uninformed] about the scope of existing privacy law, and generally
believe there are far more safeguards than actually exist").
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reliance on that promise.31 Such dealings would, however, be
premised on the perhaps mistaken assumption that the promise
would be enforceable under contract law, and the almost
certainly mistaken assumption that the promise would be
enforceable even if the company went bankrupt.31' Customers
operating under such erroneous beliefs would not value the risk
that their information could be sold, and therefore would not
adjust the price they are willing to pay for the risk of disclosure.
Thus, they may pay too much for the goods they purchase,
introducing a market imperfection that redounds solely to their
detriment." 2
Moreover, consumers have further difficulty in valuing the
risk of disclosure accurately because they often do not know how
much information the site has gathered about them.313 They are,
of course, aware of what data they have provided in response to
"ask and answer" questions, but may be completely unaware of
the clickstream data the site has accumulated about them
through the use of tools that record transaction generated
information. " Again, consumers are likely paying too much for
the products they purchase because they are not fully informed
about the site's collection of data about them, and the value of
that information to the site.
Further, consumers may lack the knowledge and ability to
appreciate the level of risk associated even with data that they
intentionally disclose.31 For example, certain information, like
310. See Statements on IntroducedBills, 146 CONG. REC. S6575, (daily ed. July 12,
2000) (statement of Senator Leahy) ("Customers have a right to expect an online firm to
adhere to its privacy policies whether it is making a profit or has filed for bankruptcy.").
311. Even if several well-publicized cases were to permit the sale of information over
the promise in bankruptcy, other courts may disagree, allowing the customer to persist in
a belief that her information is protected against transfer even in bankruptcy.
312. See generally Samuelson, supra note 31, at 1127 (citing PETER P. SWIRE &
ROBERT E. LrTAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC
COMIERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 8 (1998), which argues that
customers often cannot learn of "overdisclosures" of their information by companies and
may find it "daunting" to bargain with an e-tailer over what level of privacy they require).
But see Martinez, supranote 4 (noting that e-tailers have difficulty burdening consumers
with unfavorable terms because they have only one online store). Note that if a critical
mass of sophisticated consumers exists, this group can protect the uninformed. Sites
would adjust their policies to attract the knowledgeable buyers and the uninformed would
effectively free-ride on the protections knowledgeable buyers demand. See generallyDavid
M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and
Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1986).
313. Samuelson, supra note 31, at 1144 & n.105 (citing sources noting that
consumers are often ignorant about what data is compiled about them and how it is used).
314. Refer to Part II.A.1 supra.
315. See Samuelson, supra note 31, at 1128 & n.16 ("[Some] regard cognitive
limitations on the ability of individuals to comprehend and accurately assess the risks of
revealing personal data to others as a reason for the law to provide corrective measures.");
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social security numbers, can facilitate identity theft if it falls into
unauthorized hands.316 That the consumer would ultimately not
be liable for any activities of the impostor does not compensate
her for the considerable time, expense, and frustration in
uncovering and unraveling the theft. Consumers may
underestimate the probability as well as the magnitude of the
loss that can occur when a site discloses data intentionally or not,
in ways that the consumer never anticipated.
Moreover, there are non-economic policies that suggest that
the bankruptcy result may be inappropriate when viewed from a
broader perspective. For example, some commentators argue that
a certain level of privacy is not only desirable but also necessary
to safeguard our democratic system. 317
Thus, the task is two-fold. First, the law should be drawn to
encourage markets to work more efficiently by providing
consumers with the information that will allow them to value the
risk of disclosure of their data more accurately. Second, society
must make some policy choices as to whether there are certain
types of information that the law should recognize as nontransferable. A legal rule of inalienability may be appropriate for
some types of highly personal information, not only when the
data collector has promised not to disclose such data, but also
even if the customer is willing to permit its transfer.
B.

The Market Reaction to the Issues that Toysmart Presents

At least some e-tailers responded to the issues raised by the
Toysmart case by rewriting their privacy policies. For example,
two of the most popular sites, Amazon1 8 and eBay," 9 have revised
see also Grether, supra note 312, at 277 ("Broadly speaking,... market failure [as a
result of imperfect information] can occur in two ways: as a result of problems that exist
'in the world' and as a result of problems that exist in consumers' heads.").
316.
See 147 CONG. REC. E988 (daily ed. May 25, 2001) (statement of Rep. Shaw).
317.
See Samuelson, supra note 31, at 1128 & n.15 (citing arguments for increased
protection of personal data based on a perception that such information is, inter alia, a
fundamental liberty interest); Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic
Privacy, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 739-40 (2001).
318. Amazon's old policy stated that Amazon "does not sell, trade, or rent your
personal information to others," although it also stated that Amazon "may choose to do so
in the future with trustworthy third parties." Loomis, supranote 56. Amazons new policy
states: "[I]n the unlikely event that Amazon.com Inc., or substantially all of its assets are
acquired.... customer information will of course be one of the transferred assets." Id.
Amazon also limited its customers' abilities to "opt-out" of sales to third parties. See id.
"Now, Amazon limits the choice to opt-out only from promotional offers on behalf of other
businesses." Id.
319. See eBay, Frequently Asked Questions about the Privacy Policy Revision, at
http://pages.ebay.com/help/basics/pprevisionl-faq.html (last visited July 29, 2001).
[eBay] made a policy change to comply with an evolving industry standard in
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their privacy policies to provide for the sale of customer
information in the event of a sale of the entire business."' Under
such policies, if bankruptcy occurs, the law would permit the
trustee to sell the customer list because no applicable
nonbankruptcy law prevents such a sale. There simply is no
contract or property right on which the customer may base an
argument that the trustee cannot transfer this information. Nor
is a constitutional argument likely to succeed. In the absence of
an enforceable promise, the customer is unlikely to have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in her information. Moreover,
the contract that does exist allows the sale of information. 2 '
Thus, what the outcome in the Toysmart case would eventually
have been is irrelevant because e-tailers will change their
contracts to allow the sale of data explicitly.
This market solution demonstrates that customer lists are
valuable, and companies need to use them in raising money. The
uncertainty that attended the treatment of Toysmart's list
caused it to decline in value.3 22 By entering into a contract that
enumerates the circumstances under which the site may sell
customer data, an e-tailer can provide its creditors and
consumers alike with more certainty. This certainty allows
creditors to value the data and consumers the risk of its
disclosure more accurately. But is this market solution the
efficient one, especially given that many sites do not offer privacy

light of the Federal Trade Commission's action with the Toysmart Web site.
Since that decision, many popular Web sites have modified their privacy policies
to state that user information is an asset, and as such, they could sell, transfer,
or rent that information to any third party. One of the most troubling aspects of
such a policy is that it does not clarify how a third party could use your
information. Our new policy describes the few rare instances in which we would
transfer your information to a third party and the limited circumstances in
which your information could be used.
Id.
See also eBay PrivacyPolicy, at http:/pages.ebay.com/help/community/png-priv.html (last
visited Aug. 5, 2001).
It is possible that eBay, its subsidiaries, its joint ventures, or any combination of
such, could merge with or be acquired by another business entity. Should such a
combination occur, you should expect that eBay would share some or all of your
information in order to continue to provide the service. You will receive notice of
such event.., and we will require that the new combined entity follow the
practices disclosed in this Privacy Policy.
Id.
320. See eBay PrivacyPolicy, supranote 319; see also Loomis, supranote 56.
321. See eBay PrivacyPolicy, supra note 319; see also Loomis, supra note 56.
322. See Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Consumer Privacy Clashes with
Creditors'Rights, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 12, 2000, at 3 (noting that Toysmart's database kept
declining in value over time and that the case may lead investors and creditors to be even
more reluctant to invest money in dot-corn firms).
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policies, and some that do now provide for unrestricted transfer
(rather than as part of the sale of the business) of information?
If the market were perfectly competitive, the market
solution would indeed be efficient. But even the Internet is not a
perfectly competitive market, making it ill-advised to conclude
that contracts permitting sale of customer data in all or only in
limited circumstances represent the competitive equilibrium.
In particular, in the absence of a comprehensive statement
setting forth what information a site gathers (including
transaction generated information), customers will still be unable
to calculate the risk of disclosure accurately. Additionally, a
provision listing when a sale of data is permissible will not
correct the customer's potential lack of an ability to understand
the implications of sale. The market solution also has not yet
evolved to label any information inalienable. Moreover,
bankruptcy law likely permits a site like Amazon or eBay to
break even the promise not to sell the information except as part
of the sale of the entire business.
TRUSTe has recently issued guidelines to its licensees
regarding the treatment of customer information in
bankruptcy.3 23 The guidelines provide that TRUSTe licensees
selling customer information as part of the asset portfolio
must give all consumers a reasonable opportunity to
prevent the sale of their personally identifiable information
[PII], if: a. The PII will be used or disclosed by the buyer
for a purpose not outlined in the TRUSTe privacy
statement; b. The PII will be used for a purpose unrelated
to the primary purpose for which it was collected, or c. The
company promised not to sell, rent, or share the personally
identifiable information.32 4
According to TRUSTe, the guidelines mean that if a TRUSTe
licensee site has promised not to transfer information, it can sell
only the data of those customers who opt into the sale.32 If the
site originally stated that it would share customer information, it
must notify consumers even before transferring data to a

323. See TRUSTe Guidelineson Personally Identifiable Information Uses in Mergers,
Acquisitions, Bankruptcies, Closures, and Dissolutions of Web Sites 8-9 (2001)
[hereinafter TRUSTe Guidelines], at http:/www.truste.org/bus/pub-mabs.html; see also
New TRUSTe GuidelinesPropose "Opt Out" Protectionfor Customers ofFailingEntities, 6
No. 16 ELEc. COMMERCE & L. REP. (BNA), Apr. 23, 2001, at 409 (summarizing the
contents of TRUSTe's guidelines).
324. TRUSTe Guidelines, supra note 323, at 8.
325. Id. at 8,13.
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company offering similar services, offering consumers an ability
to opt out of the sale." 6
Of course, not all sites are TRUSTe licensees, making any
proposal by that organization something less than a "market"
solution. Nonetheless, it merits analysis because it is the closest
thing to a market standard that the e-tailing industry is likely to
have anytime soon. The TRUSTe approach protects consumers by
preventing the sale of their information without their consent
when the site had made a promise of non-disclosure.3 27 The policy
is also more generous to consumers than the modified eBay and
Amazon policies. Even in cases in which the site has indicated it
would sell information, consumers may choose to opt out of the
sale.328 Ostensibly, the consumer would make her selection at
some date later-that is, when bankruptcy occurs-than the time
when she actually enters into a contract with the site and
provides information. This approach makes it extremely difficult
for potential creditors to value the list because they would have
to estimate what consumers would elect to do at some future,
unknown time.
Additionally, the TRUSTe guidelines do not address whether
certain types of information should be inalienable. They also fail
to account for consumers' potential inabilities to understand the
issues involved and calculate the risk and cost of disclosure.
Furthermore, any agreements between TRUSTe and its licensees
do not bind the bankruptcy trustee. The trustee would remain
free to reject contracts and ignore promises made by TRUSTe
licensees to their customers.
C. Other Proposed Solutions
After the Toysmart bankruptcy occurred, Congress
entertained a variety of bills proposed to deal more or less
explicitly with the issues the case raised.329 Additionally, for a
number of years, academic commentators have been discussing
privacy concerns generally. The following considers the
desirability of some proposed legislation and one academic
proposal. It concludes that none of the approaches solves the

326. Id. at 13 (providing examples of how TRUSTe's guidelines should be
interpreted).
327.
Id.
328. Id.
329.
Privacy has become a "hot" topic, with policymakers offering new approaches
almost daily. See, e.g., 147 Cong. Rec. E988 (daily ed. May 25, 2001) (statement of Rep.
Shaw); 147 Cong. S6337 (daily ed. Jun. 14, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). This
Article concentrates on policy solutions offered shortly after the Toysmart case.
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twofold problem noted above, and proposes legislation that would
do so at least in part.
1.

Legislative Proposals

a. H.R. 4814. On July 10, 2000, Representative Bachus
introduced a bill that would "make illegal the sale, share, or transfer
of information acquired on the Internet with a pledge that it would
not be released." 330 The text of the bill, however, is inconsistent with
its description. Section 1 provides:
It shall be considered an unfair practice in or affecting
commerce which violates section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act... for a person to sell on the Internet
information such person acquired with a pledge that the
information would be kept private and not released or for a
person to share or transfer to another such information on
the Internet. 1
Apparently, the bill targets any Internet sale of information that
was collected online or offline with an assurance that it would
not be sold. If this is the case, then the bill may be easily
circumvented by the data aggregator's sale of the information
through a medium other than the Internet.
If the bill, despite its language, were intended to make
illegal the sale of information collected on the Internet when the
aggregator has promised not to disclose the data, it elevates
privacy concerns over bankruptcy policy. An outright ban on sale
seems rather overbroad if one believes that the mere existence of
the pledge should not be the end of the story, at least in
bankruptcy. It provides no exception to shelter any sale
(ostensibly even if a consumer consents), thus depriving the
bankruptcy estate of a potentially valuable aisset. The FTC, while
adopting a similar approach in the Toysmart case, would have
allowed the data to be sold in bankruptcy to a Qualified Buyer
that agreed to abide by the privacy policy's terms and
conditions.33 Although the bankruptcy judge indicated she would
not allow a sale of the list under the settlement, she had the
power to do exactly the opposite of what she indicated would be
desirable: she could have refused to enforce the settlement
because it would deplete the bankruptcy estate and permitted
the list to be sold.333 Of course, the judge eventually approved a

330.
331.
332.
333.

H.R. 4814, 106th Cong. § 1 (2d Sess. 2000).
Id.
Refer to notes 76-78 supra and accompanying text.
Refer to note 82 supra and accompanying text.
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investors when the investor promised to
sale to one of Toysmart's
33 4
destroy the list.
Further, H.R. 4814 makes no distinction between publicly
available information like name and address, or more private
data like social security numbers.3 35 By addressing only those
cases in which the site made a non-disclosure promise,336 the
proposal ostensibly gives sites that do not make such promises
free reign to sell even highly personal information. H.R. 4814
also did not require that sites inform consumers about what data
they collect and how they expect to use it.
b. S. 2857. Senators Leahy, Kohl and Torricelli proposed the
Privacy Policy Enforcement in Bankruptcy Act of 2000. 337 The Act
would amend section 541(b) of the Bankruptcy Code to exclude
personally identifiable information from inclusion in the bankruptcy
estate if "the sale or disclosure of personally identifiable information
violates a privacy policy of the debtor in effect at the time at which
such information was collected."338 Personally identifiable
information would include name, address (physical or e-mail), phone
number, social security number, credit card number, birth date and
place, and "any other identifier that permits the physical or
electronic contacting of a specific individual."33"9
This proposal may be at once too narrow and too broad. Like
H.R. 4814, it is too narrow because it only addresses instances in
which the site has a privacy policy that forbids sale, and
ostensibly does not permit a consumer to consent to sale of her
information. If the market continues to move to privacy policies
that authorize sale, this legislation would effectively be a dead
letter. Sites would be free to sell all information, no matter how
personal. It may be too broad because it excludes from the estate
much information that today would be sold in bankruptcy
without a second thought-like names and addresses.
c. S. 2928. Shortly after the introduction of S. 2857, Senator
John McCain and others introduced a more comprehensive privacy
bill entitled the Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Act.34 °
Under the bill, it would be

Refer to notes 83-84 supra and accompanying text.
334.
335.
See H.R. 4814 § 1 (prohibiting only the transfer of "information... acquired
with a pledge that the information would be kept private...
See id.
336.
S. 2857, 106th Cong. § 1 (2d Sess. 2000).
337.
338.
Id. § 2(3).
339.
Id.
S. 2928, 106th Cong. § 1 (2d Sess. 2000).
340.
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unlawful for a commercial website operator to collect
personally identifiable information online from a user...
unless the operator provides-(1) notice.., and (2) an
opportunity to that user to limit the use for marketing
purposes, or disclosure to third parties of personally
identifiable information that is-(A) not related to provision
of the products or services provided by the website; or (B)
not required to be disclosed by law.3 4'
The notice to which the bill refers must include certain
disclosures including a "description of how the operator uses such
information, including a statement as to whether the information
may be sold... or otherwise made available to third parties for
marketing purposes."3 42 It must also describe how a user may
choose not to have its information sold.343 The notice must be
"clear, conspicuous, and easily understood," and "[tihe
opportunity provided to users to limit use and disclosure of
personally identifiable information [must] be easy to use, easily
accessible, and... available online." 44 Failure to provide the
notice and opportunity to limit disclosure would constitute an
"unfair or deceptive act or practice" under the FTC Act.345
The proposed privacy legislation does not change bankruptcy
law.34 It does, however, make it less likely that consumers will be
unaware that a Web site may sell the information they provide
both in and out of bankruptcy. By requiring that the notice be
conspicuous, 47 the bill increases the probability that consumers
will read and understand how the site will treat their
information. By requiring it to be "easily understood,""' the
legislation would minimize at least some difficulties consumers
may have in understanding its contents. By providing an "opt
out,"349 the legislation gives consumers greater control over the
341.
Id. § 2(a).
Id. § 2(b).
342.
343.
See id. § 2(b)(1)(G) (requiring that the Web site operator provide a "description
of the means by which a user may elect not to have the user's personally identifiable
information [collected online by that] operator.., except for (i) information related to the
provision of the product or service provided by the web site; or (ii) information required to
be disclosed by law").
344. Id. § 2(b)(2)-(3).
345.
Id. § 3(a).
346.
See Statements on Introduced Bills, supra note 4 (noting that privacy is a
difficult issue, and "[o]ther related concerns that should be addressed will continue to
arise as we consider this [legislation]-[flor example, the sale of data during
bankruptcy"). The legislation and statements introducing it offered no opinion on how to
resolve that issue.
347.
S. 2928, 106th Cong. § 2(b)(2) (2d Sess. 2000).
348.
Id.
349.
Id. § 2(a)(2), (b)(3).
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disposition of their information. This allows the consumer to
choose whether or not she wants to permit her information to be
sold, and also permits the consumer to understand the trade-offs
involved."' For example, opting out may require the consumer to
pay a higher price for the product. The consumer may then
decide whether or not the enhanced privacy protection merits
payment of the higher price. The legislation would also make
valuation easier for creditors; ostensibly, the consumer specifies
the privacy terms when she originally contracts with the site,
and cannot later "opt out" of a sale in bankruptcy if she had
previously "opted in." The legislation, however, will do little to
assist consumers who have difficulties in understanding the
relevant cost/benefit analysis.
d. The Senate's Approach in the ProposedAmendments to the
Bankruptcy Code. As discussed above, the Senate has grappled with
the "Toysmart" problem as part of its fairly comprehensive recent
proposed overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code. Under one version of the
bill, section 363(b)(1) would read in part:
The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or
lease, other than in the ordinary course of business,
property of the estate, except that if the debtor has
disclosed a policy to an individual prohibiting the transfer
of personally identifiable information about the individual
to unaffiliated third persons, and the policy remains in
effect at the time of the bankruptcy filing, the trustee may
not sell or lease such personally identifiable information to
any person, unless(A) the sale is consistent with such prohibition; or
(B) the court, after notice and hearing and due
consideration of the fact, circumstances, and condition of
the sale or lease, approves the sale or lease .... 1
350. The notice must also describe "[w]hether the user is required to provide
personally identifiable information in order to use the website and any other
consequences of failure to provide that information." Id. § 2(b)(1)(E).
351. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420, 107th Cong. §§ 231-232 (1st Sess.
2001). The amendment defines "personally identifiable information" as follows:
(b) DEFINITON.-Section 101 of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
inserting after paragraph (41) the following:
'(41A) "personally identifiable information", if provided by the individual to
the debtor in connection with obtaining a product or service from the debtor
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes(A) means(i) the individual's first name (or initials) and last name... ;
(ii) the physical address for the individual's home;
(iii) the individual's e-mail address;
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This legislation may provide even less protection to the customer
than the FTC's proposed settlement with Toysmart would have
offered.
Besides allowing a court to rule that the information may be
sold with or without conditions, the provision also contains the
curious phraseology "and the policy remains in effect at the time
of the bankruptcy filing."35 Is this an open invitation to ebusinesses to revoke the policy on the eve of bankruptcy, even if
such revocation causes a breach of contract? After all, if the
policy is not in effect when the petition is filed, the protective
provision ostensibly does not apply. Thus, the proposed wording
may provide scant comfort to customers who provide information
even to sites that promise not to disclose it. Indeed, Congress has
generally done little to advance privacy concerns in the 2001
proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Code.
The amendment closes the door, at least by implication, on
laws outside of the Bankruptcy Code that might impede this
right of sale. For example, because the Bankruptcy Code
administers property but ordinarily does not define what it is, or
who has rights in it,353 the Senate amendment breaks new
ground. It says, at least by implication from putting the
amendment in section 363, that a customer list is property,
regardless of what other state or federal nonbankruptcy law
would say.
The amendment does, however, establish a "Consumer
Privacy Ombudsman" to be appointed by the court at the
trustee's request when the trustee "intends to sell or lease
personally identifiable information in a manner which requires a

(iv) the individual's home telephone number;
(v) the individual's social security number; or
(vi) the individual's credit card account number; and
(B) means, when identified in connection with one or more of the
items of information listed in subparagraph (A)(i) an individual's birth date, birth certificate number, or place of
birth; or
(ii) any other information concerning an identified individual that,
if disclosed, will result in the physical or electronic contacting or
identification of that person;'.
Id.
352. Id. § 231(a).
353. See, e.g., Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 398 (1992) (quoting Butner v.
United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979) to explain that "Congress has generally left the
determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law"); see
also Butner, 440 U.S. at 54-55 (explaining that state law, not the Bankruptcy Code,
determines the question whether a security interest in property extends to rents and
profits).
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hearing.""' The ombudsman is to provide the court with
information, including costs and benefits of allowing a sale to
occur and proposals alternative to sale. 55 The court, however,
remains free to order the sale of the list like any other piece of
property, once the ombudsman has had his or her say."'
By introducing the ombudsman post-bankruptcy, with the
laudable goal of protecting consumers, Congress would create a
good deal of uncertainty for both consumers and creditors. The
ombudsman may recommend that the court permit the sale of
the information or it may not-and the court is free to reject
whatever recommendation the ombudsman makes. 357 Thus,
354.
S. 420 § 232. This amendment defines the scope and duties of the ombudsman
as follows:
(a) IN GENERAL.(1) APPOINTMENT ON REQUEST.-If the trustee intends to sell or lease
personally identifiable information in a manner which requires a
hearing described in section 363(b)(1)(B), the trustee shall request, and
the court shall appoint, an individual to serve as ombudsman during
the case not later than
(A) on or before the expiration of 30 days after the date of the order for
relief; or
(B) 5 days prior to any hearing described in section 363(b)(1)(B) of title
11, United States Code, as amended by this Act.
(2) DuTIES OF OAIBUDSMAN.-It shall be the duty of the ombudsman to
provide the court information to assist the court in its consideration of
the facts, circumstances, and conditions of the sale or lease under
section 363(b)(1)(B) of title 11, United States Code, as amended by this
Act. Such information may include a presentation of the debtor's
privacy policy in effect, potential losses or gains of privacy to
consumers if the sale or lease is approved, potential costs or benefits to
consumers if the sale or lease is approved, and potential alternatives
which mitigate potential privacy losses or potential costs to consumers.
(3) NOTICE TO OMBUDSAN.-The ombudsman shall receive notice of, and
shall have a right to appear and be heard, at any hearing described in
section 363b(1)(B) of title 11, United States Code, as amended by this
Act.
(4) CONFIDENTIALITY.-The ombudsman shall maintain any personally
identifiable information obtained by the ombudsman under this title as
confidential information.
(b) APPOINTMENT.-If the court orders the appointment of an ombudsman
under this section, the United States Trustee shall appoint 1 disinterested
person, other than the United States trustee, to serve as the ombudsman.
(c) COMPENSATION OF CONSUMER PRIVACY OMBUDSAN.-Section 330(a)(1) of
title 11, United States Code, is amended in the matter preceding
subparagraph (A), by inserting 'an ombudsman appointed under section
332,' before 'an examiner'.
Id.
355.
See id.
356.
Id. § 2(a)(2) (providing that the ombudsman role is only "to assist the court in its
consideration[s]" and vesting no further authority in the ombudsman besides this
advisory role).
357.
Id.
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consumers would not know at the outset how their information
would fare in bankruptcy, nor would creditors. Valuation
difficulties would thus abound.
Not surprisingly, since the amendment is specific to
bankruptcy law, it does not grapple with the broader issue of
making the market more efficient by increasing the probability
that consumers make informed decisions. Nor does it make any
attempt to address their cognitive limits, or to answer the
question whether some data is so personal it should never be
sold.
2. Are Property Rights in Personal Data the Solution?
Commentators have been discussing how to define and implement
the appropriate level of privacy protection, particularly in an
information society, for a number of years. One proposal that often
receives attention in the United States, perhaps because it seems
more like a market solution than a government regulatory initiative,
is to afford individuals property rights in their personal
information.3 5 If consumers had property rights in their personal
data, they could exclude unlicensed firms from using that
information. Licenses could define the permitted uses of the
information, and would allow consumers to capture some of the
value associated with their information-value that now generally
accrues in its entirety to the data gathering firm. This approach
would enhance market efficiency.359
If customers had such property rights, their arguments for
stopping the sale of their information in bankruptcy when the
site has promised not to disclose it would be stronger than under
current law where such rights are lacking."' Recall the
bankruptcy analysis of Part III. Arguably, once the consumer has
a property interest rather than merely a contract interest, the
bankrupt does not have the required "stick" in the bundle of
property rights to permit it to include the customer list in the
estate. Even if it does, the customer has a stronger argument
that she has an interest in the list. The trustee can only sell the
358. See Jessica Litman, Cyberspace and Privacy:A New Legal Paradigm?,52 STAN.
L. REV. 1283, 1288-90 (2000) (discussing the property rights approach and the
commentators who have embraced it); Samuelson, supra note 31, at 1132 & nn.35-37
(explaining why some favor a property rights approach for personal data).
359. See Samuelson, supra note 31, at 1132 ("Some favor propertizing personal data
as a way to allow individuals to make appropriate deals for selling their personal data
and to receive compensation for uses of their personal data so that markets in personal
information will work more fairly. Others favor propertizing personal data as a way of
forcing companies to internalize more fully the costs associated with the collection and
processing of personal data, in the hope that this will lead to greater privacy.").
360. Refer to Part III.A.2.b supra.
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list free of this interest if it meets one of the conditions of section
363(f). 361
However, for a number of reasons, granting consumers
property rights in their information may not be an appropriate
solution. Even if the grant of property rights would implement an
appropriate result in bankruptcy, it may introduce unintended
consequences outside of bankruptcy. Creating a market in
personal information would require the construction of a
considerable infrastructure to make this new market work,
increasing transaction costs.36 2 Property law also generally
permits alienability, but many customers may prefer just the
opposite.3 63 Perversely, a property right may exacerbate
consumers' difficulties in processing information as data
aggregators demand broad rights but individuals underestimate
the value of their information and the risk of sale. "As difficult as
it may be for the average person to judge the risks of personal
data misuse as a general matter, it may be even more difficult for
the average person to judge the risks of selling her property
rights in personal data."6 4
D. A Proposal
Any proposal should be drawn with reference to the twopronged nature of the problem identified above: (1) The market
for personal information is often inefficient because consumers
lack information and the ability to value both their data and the
risk of disclosure; and (2) there may be some information that
should be inalienable because of its highly personal nature. An
appropriate solution may be one that implements a version of the
McCain bill discussed above, provides fairly explicit resolution of
the treatment of customer information in bankruptcy, and
defines certain information as inalienable.
The information that consumers lack includes knowledge of
the relevant law and, in many cases, knowledge of what
information the site gathers and under what terms.36 The
McCain bill, by requiring a commercial Web site owner to provide
"notice" to users, solves at least some of the problems inherent in
the current information asymmetry between Web sites and their
users. The bill should also specifically provide that a site must
361. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (1994).
362. Samuelson, supra note 31, at 1136-37 (arguing that increased complexity and
higher transaction costs would naturally follow from a property rights approach).
363. Id. at 1138.
364. Id. at 1145.
365. See Kang, supra note 309, at 1253, n.255.
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inform users of how bankruptcy law would treat the information.
As described further below, Congress should then also amend the
bankruptcy law to require it generally to respect a site's privacy
policy.
One alternative approach 66 that, while still requiring an
amendment to the Bankruptcy Code, would not require the
enactment of a McCain-type bill that many consider invasive, is
to rely on technology to inform consumers. Software exists that
can allow a consumer to specify the privacy protection she
wants.6 7 If the program encounters a site that does not offer that
level of protection, it will inform the consumer who can decide
whether or not to do business with the site. 8 Under this
scenario, software rather than regulation corrects information
asymmetries. The only legislative change required would be to
the Code. Unfortunately, however, many consumers are unaware
of the technology that exists, the software itself may not work
very well, and any technological fix can be defeated by yet
another, different technology. Thus, a legislative solution, even
though it constrains firms' freedom of action, is preferable to a
non-regulatory approach.
If a legislative solution like that described here were
enacted, a site would have two choices: to disclose a policy under
which it would promise to keep information confidential even in
bankruptcy, and one under which it would not. If a site went
bankrupt, what should be the result under each scenario?
If the site promised not to sell customer information in
bankruptcy, it seems only fair (economically and otherwise for
the reasons discussed earlier) that bankruptcy law uphold that
promise. The customer should have seen the notice (it is, after
all, definitionally conspicuous), and thus believed that the site
would not sell her information even in bankruptcy. The
366.
Another approach that would also not require privacy legislation (although it
would still require an amendment to the Bankruptcy Code) would be to educate
consumers on the applicable law and the relative lack of privacy protection both in and
out of bankruptcy. Consumers would then assume that all information they provide
(including their movements on the site) could be sold, and would adjust the price they
would be willing to pay accordingly (by decreasing it). A site would then have an incentive
to disclose an intent not to transfer information. Congress should then amend the
bankruptcy law to permit enforcement of such a promise unless a consumer opts in to sale
of her information at the time of bankruptcy. Refer to notes 370-77 infra and
accompanying text. This approach has the virtue of not overloading customers with
information that they are unlikely to read.
367. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View
From a Liberal DemocraticTheory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 395, 478-79 (2000) (citing P3P and
Privacyon the Web FAQ, What is P3, at http'J/www.w3.org/P3P/P3FAQ.html, as one of the
examples of privacy software tools available to consumers).
368. Id.
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bankruptcy court should permit the bankrupt site to ask its
customers for permission to sell their information. The bankrupt
may sell only the information of those customers who opt in to
the sale.
Although this approach would require an amendment to the
Code, 3 9 it is not at odds with bankruptcy policy. Creditors will
know at the outset that if the required privacy policy promises
non-disclosure then the customer list is not a saleable asset."'
Thus, they will not lend in reliance on the list's existence.
Congress may nevertheless believe that enforcing the nondisclosure promise in bankruptcy is too "pro-consumer" and
"anti-creditor." Congress might also conclude that upholding a
promise not to sell information in bankruptcy would unduly
hamper the recovery of dot-coin companies. It may thus decide to
seek a middle ground like the one that the FTC sought with
Toysmart.
The FTC settlement limited the class of buyers to those in
the same type of business as the bankrupt, and required any
buyer to adhere to Toysmart's privacy policy. This settlement
reduced the value of the customer list compared to what it would
have been had Toysmart been able to sell it without restriction.
While such a settlement may not be in Toysmart's creditors'
interests, it helps to ensure that any purchaser will respect a
customer's privacy, and provides creditors with more money than
if the non-disclosure promise were fully enforced. Also, the
customer is less likely to be harmed by a transfer to a company
that, as FTC Commissioner Thompson noted in the Toysmart
case, literally stands in the shoes of the bankrupt. If Congress
selects this approach, it should be reflected in an amendment to
the Code to prevent any question whether such a settlement that,
on the surface, appears to deplete the estate is permissible. This
approach may be particularly appropriate when the information

369. The Senate's proposed S. 2857 would provide a good starting point. It could
easily be amended to prohibit sale of a list except of the information of those customers
vho have opted in to the sale.
370.
One topic this Article has not addressed is the treatment of customer lists when
the site has offered them to a secured party as collateral. If the site/debtor defaults, the
secured party has a right to repossess and resell the collateral under UCC Article 9. See
U.C.C. §§ 9-609 to 9-610 (2000) (allowing the secured party to repossess and resell upon
the default of the debtor). Default can occur in the absence of bankruptcy. It would indeed
be anomalous if a secured creditor could repossess the list, disregard the debtor's promise
to its customers, and sell it, but the bankruptcy trustee could not. Whether or not the
secured party could do this depends on the contents of Article 9 and other state law.
Determining what those laws would say and what arguments could be made in
interpreting them is beyond the scope of this Article.
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consists only of that which has always been sold in bankruptcyname, address, and phone number.
Practically, if the two-pronged approach suggested here
(enactment of a comprehensive privacy statute like the McCain
bill coupled with an amendment to the Code providing either for
bankruptcy law's enforcement of a non-disclosure promise or that
law's permitting sale over such a promise only in limited
conditions like those of the FTC's settlement with Toysmart)
were adopted, sites would likely cease to offer non-disclosure
promises. Indeed, even in the absence of such legislation, sites
have begun to amend their privacy policies to provide for transfer
of customer information either generally or as part of the sale of
the entire business. Should the data then be sold in bankruptcy
according to the terms of the privacy policy?
If the legislative steps suggested moved the market to a
state of perfect competition, then bankruptcy law should permit
the sale of data in accordance with the terms of the policy. Again,
however, markets are not perfectly competitive. Consumers,
although now "informed" may lack the ability to understand and
appreciate what the policy means and to evaluate the risk it
imposes. The problem, of course, is how to correct for this
somewhat speculative lack of ability and still provide creditors
and Web sites with some certainty.
The best approach may be one that amends the Code by
adopting a presumption that the bankrupt may transfer the list
under the terms of the privacy policy that permits such transfers.
Any such amendment may authorize a court to appoint an
ombudsman, like that proposed in the Senate's bankruptcy bill,
to challenge the sale. The law has traditionally adjusted for a
consumer's lack of understanding under doctrines like
unconscionability.3 7' A bankruptcy court could do the same.
For example, if the bankrupt site had not complied with the
McCain-type bill requiring clear and conspicuous notice of its
intent to sell customer information in bankruptcy, the amended
Code should provide a court with options in deciding whether and
how to conduct a sale. The court's options should include at least
(i) permitting a sale only of the information of those customers
who opt in to the sale (a restrictive approach); (ii) permitting a
sale of all information except that of customers who opt out of the
sale (a less restrictive approach); (iii) permitting a sale under
more restrictive terms than the privacy policy would permit (for
example, placing conditions like those the FTC sought in the

371.

FARNSWORTH, supranote 86, § 4.28.
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Toysmart case on a site whose policy permitted unrestricted
transfer); (iv) some combination of the foregoing; and (v)
prohibiting sale of the information altogether. In making its
decision, the court should be guided by the economic and noneconomic considerations outlined above.
Giving the bankruptcy judge this discretion arguably
increases uncertainty for all parties-consumers, creditors, and
the Web site. However, recall that bankruptcy courts are courts
of equity." 2 Achieving an equitable result often introduces an
element of uncertainty. The proposal could be further refined to
reduce uncertainty by enumerating the circumstances under
which the ombudsman could mount a challenge. If the
ombudsman were only authorized to challenge sales when the
privacy policy failed to comply with the McCain-type bill, the
level of uncertainty would decline dramatically.
Before limiting challenges to this circumstance, however,
legislators should consider whether some information should be
inalienable or inalienable in the absence of some more express
consent than simply clicking an "I agree" button on a Web site.373
At least two policies may support inalienability. In some cases,
the consumer may lack the ability to appreciate the risks
inherent in the disclosure of certain highly personal information.
Indeed, the consumer may underestimate the risk even in light of
a detailed disclosure. For example, a site might inform the
consumer that it will record her social security number, that it
plans to sell that information, and even that sale of that
information may make identity theft more likely. If the consumer
cannot accurately process that risk, Congress should consider
making that
information inalienable both in and out of
374
bankruptcy.

372. Refer to note 211 supra and accompanying text.
373. A proposed bill to limit disclosure of social security numbers is a step toward
making them inalienable. See H.R. 2036, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001). This proposal
would make it:
unlawful for any person to-(1) sell, purchase, or display a social security
account number, or (2) obtain or use any individual's social security account
number for the purpose of locating or identifying such individual with the intent
to physically injure or harm such individual or using the identity of such
individual for any illegal purpose.
Id. This is not a rule of true inalienability, however, because the individual may provide
"voluntary and affirmative written consent to the sale, purchase, or display of a social
security account number." Id. § 201(c)(6). To the extent that this legislation focuses on
increasing consumer awareness of how entities use personal data, it is consistent with the
proposal here which emphasizes informing customers of such use.
374. See id. § 201(b).
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A second reason why legislators might choose to make
certain information inalienable is that other policy interests may
support such a move. As noted above, some commentators argue
that the law must enforce a certain zone of privacy to safeguard
our democratic system." Legislators should at least consider the
insights of these commentators in determining whether certain
information should be inalienable. Once the legislature makes
this determination of inalienability, the argument for limiting
the grounds on which the ombudsman can challenge a
contractually authorized sale is more persuasive because other
safeguards protect consumers' privacy.
Thus, to address the two issues set forth at the outset of this
section (market imperfections primarily in the form of
information asymmetry and the lack of a definition of what, if
any, information should be inalienable), Congress should: (i)
enact comprehensive privacy legislation like the McCain bill with
the additions suggested here; (ii) amend bankruptcy law by
either requiring it to enforce a promise not to disclose personal
information or permitting sale under provisions like those the
FTC sought to impose on Toysmart; (iii) amend bankruptcy law
by defining the circumstances under which that law will permit
an ombudsman to challenge a sale authorized by a privacy policy
and providing guidance on what options are available to the
bankruptcy court; and (iv) decide whether some information
should be inalienable and so provide in the relevant law.
An initial problem with the congressional approach just
suggested is that Congress may lack the constitutional power to
implement all of the legislation suggested. Presumably, it could
enact the McCain-type bill under its Commerce Clause power.
The Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution would authorize
congressional modifications to bankruptcy law to define what the
trustee may do with estate property. But under what power could
Congress make certain information inalienable? There is no
general federal law of property. State law generally defines
property (apart from intellectual property) and its concomitant
rights. Perhaps Congress could act, at least with respect to
information customers provide on the Internet, under its
Commerce Clause power.376 If so, this raises the question whether
it would make sense to have two rules of alienability for personal
information: one to govern cyberspace (the federal rule) and the
other to govern "real" space (the relevant state law rule). Indeed,
375.
See Reidenberg, supra note 317, at 739-40.
376. Samuelson, supra note 31, at 1141 (arguing that the Commerce Clause might
permit Congress to grant property rights in information provided online).
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even those businesses who have traditionally resisted legislation
creating privacy rights would, if such legislation must be
implemented, prefer a uniform federal approach. To avoid
constitutional problems, however, a federal statute followed by
uniform state enactments may provide the best solution.
Finally, it bears repeating that this regulatory approach
does not sacrifice bankruptcy policy on the altar of creating
privacy rights. Instead, it balances legitimate consumer
expectations with bankruptcy policy in a sensible way. Certainly,
one justification for changing the manner in which bankruptcy
law treats customer lists is that customer lists themselves have
changed. Customer databases today-whether gathered online or
offline-are much more extensive and detailed than those of the
3 77
past that contained just name, address, and phone number.
The legislative changes suggested here reflect a belief that the
customer herself should be entitled to appropriate at least some
of that value. 8
V.

CONCLUSION

The Toysmart bankruptcy raised issues about customer
privacy and creditors' rights in the new setting of the Internet.
As technology has evolved, the bankruptcy law has not, so the
traditional rationale permitting unrestricted sale of customer
information in bankruptcy may no longer hold either online or
offline. There is no reason, however, why the law cannot strike a
reasonable balance between customers' privacy and creditors'
rights in bankruptcy. Arguably, as courts of equity, bankruptcy
courts already possess the inherent power to strike that balance.
377.
Refer to Part fl.A.1 supra.
378.
That view justifies extending the rules applicable to online companies in their
treatment of customer information to offiine ones. The primary difference between the
two is that the online firm can track a customer's movements more effectively and may be
able to obtain more information because of the ostensibly personal and immediate nature
of its engagement with the customer. But even in the absence of this additional data,
bricks and mortar companies can gather detailed information, swapping it with others to
build sophisticated personal profiles without the consumer's knowledge. The same policy
reasons that support legislation online thus seem to support similar rules offline.
However, the same approaches may not be effective. For example, while a Web site can at
least place the privacy policy in front of the user, a bricks and mortar company may have
less success in increasing consumer awareness. Any consumer who has been deluged this
year with Gramm-Leach-Bliley notices from banks, credit card companies, and
merchants, is unlikely to pay much attention to yet another 'snail mail" privacy notice.
Ultimately, the solution offline may be to use state tort law to police the sale of personal
data by firms outside of bankruptcy to replicate the results a McCain-type bill would
achieve. In bankruptcy, the court-again as a court of equity-may consider whether the
company provided notice along the lines that the federal statute would require of firms
subject to its jurisdiction. Then it could follow the analysis set forth above to such firms.
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However, a carefully considered legislative approach targeted
toward solving specific problems is preferable to an ad hoc courtby-court balancing. Legislation can provide a measure of
certainty to sellers, customers, and creditors alike. Congress
should act within the extent of its powers to strike the
appropriate balance soon.

